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https://archive.org/details/thucydideswithen01 thucuoft

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

EDITED BY + T. E. PAGE, c.z., LITT.D. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. +W. H. D. ROUSE, turirt.p. , POST, mwa. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.a., F.R.HIST.SOC.

THUCYDIDES I

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PORTRAIT OF PERIKLES. BRITISH MUSEUM.

THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY CHARLES FORSTER SMITH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

IN FOUR VOLUMES I

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR BOOKS I anp II

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS MOMLYI

First printed 1919 Revised and Reprinted 1928 Reprinted 1935, 1951, 1956

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Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

PAGE PORTRAIT OF PERICLES o + © « « © « Frontispiece

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INTRODUCTION

TuREE ancient biographies} of Thucydides have come down to us, but they are of little value. They are derived from ancient commentaries, and the bio- graphical details which they contain, wherever they do not rest upon inference from the text of the history itself, are often confused and contradictory. These are supplemented by scattered statements of several ancient writers—Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucy- didis historia tudictum and the Second Letter to Am- maeus)y-Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (1, xxxii.).

The-only authentic facts about the life of Thucy- dides are gathered from casual mention in the History. He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced the compilation of materials for writing the History at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (1. i. 1); and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions ‘‘ from the commentaries,” passed under the name of Marcellinus, who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia on Hermogenes 7rep) oracewr, who seems to have lived in the fifth century A.D.; another was by an anonymous gram-

marian ; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, s.v. @ovnvdldns.

A2 vii

INTRODUCTION

judgment, following it with close attention, that he might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He suffered from the plague of 429 B.c. (1. xlviii. 3), of which he wrote his famous account (1. xlvii-—liv). Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.c., he was sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the right of working certain gold mines) to operate against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he was exiled in 424 B.c., and remained in banishment for twenty years, and thus was able to become ac- quainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5).

For other facts we are dependent largely upon inference ; some are reasonably certain, others less so. The name of his father was identical with that of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He- gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, having the inscription ®ovxvdiSys ‘OAdpov “AAmovcros, was in the suburb of Athens known as KoiAn Medc- rides, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), Thucydides’ mother was named Hegesipyle, like Cimon’s mother, that would be confirmation of the relationship ; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning

viil

INTRODUCTION

himself as orparyyds (iv. civ. 4), he writes @ov«vdisnv rov "Odcpov; for only as an Athenian citizen could his father be mentioned in this official style.

As to the date of Thucydides’ birth, the only ancient statement that seems worthy of credence was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the time of Nero made a great compilation of the results of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes from Pamphila that, at_the beginning of the Pelo- \ ponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty- -five years of | age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pam- / phila’s dates were probably taken from the chrono- logical handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.c.), which was generally accepted among the Greeks and Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila doubtless meant the dxuy or prime of Thucydides, and may have been fixed on the basis of his own assertion that he began to collect material at the opening of the war (1. i. 1) and was then in full maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own statement, taken with Pamphila’s date, has led to the general assumption that the historian was born

en

somewhere about 472 B.c. —

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is prob- able in itself, that the decree for Thucydides’ ban- ishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, ‘who was then at the heigl ight of his power; and it is probable that the charge brought against him was treachery (zpodocia), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55)

ix

INTRODUCTION

and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparentiy implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words, EvveBn por detyew, admit of this interpretation; and the~statement of Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9) that he was later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius! is best understood on this basis. If he had been banished by a simple decree of the people, the general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe, a special decree would be necessary. But it is possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius antedated the amnesty of Lysander’s peace by a few months,

As to Thucydides’ death, jthere was a persistent tradition that_he was assassinated and the fact that the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of ex citing events of the Decelean War seems to suppor the tradition.) Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was eommonly- reported that he died_a violent death at Scapte Hyle;) Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9), that he was murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcel- linus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in

1 The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood of Thasos in 410-9 z.c. and we hear somewhat later of one Eucles, son of Oenobius; hence it has been conjectured that the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides’ colleague in Thrace in 424 B.o. (Lv. civ).

INTRODUCTION

Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own words that_he outlived the term of his banishment (v. xxvi. 5, EovéBy por pevyew tiv euavtod ery etkoor) and that he returned to Athens, since his description of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains “ may still be seen at the Peiraeus”’ (1. xciii. 5), shows that

he was there after the destruction of the walls -2

Lysander. If he had lived tos see ce the re: restoration of >

med it. mafia is another reason, too, for supposing that he did not live to this year: in m1. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, which occurred in the spring of 425 B.c., was the third on record ; hence the one mentioned by Dio- dorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.c. could not have been known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume

ee There is a pretty and oft-repeated story! that

Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a portion of his History at Olympia and was moved thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, “ Olo- rus, your son’s spirit is aflame with a passion for learning.” But Lucian, when telling of the powerful effect of Herodotus’ recitation at Olympia,? would surely have mentioned this circumstance had he known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, it

1 Suidas s.v. dpyav and @ovxvdisns; Photius, Bibl. 60; Marcellinus, § 54. 2 Herod. i.

xt

7

INTRODUCTION

we hold to Pamphila’s testimony. But if he did not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he must have known him later as a man at Athens. The period of his youth and early manhood fell in the time when Athens was most prolific in great men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pe- ricles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, So- crates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. Association with such men and the atmosphere of Athens at such a time best explain the development of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first seven years of the war, before his banishment, were doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the dis- cussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as about other matters of which we have accounts in this History. But the twenty years of his exile he probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace,} engaged in the task of compiling materials for his work about the war, as indeed we are told that he

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region (rv. ev. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his

biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at Scapte Hyle.

xii

INTRODUCTION

did by Plutarch (De Ezil. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 and 47).

From Thucydides’ opening statement, that he began the composition of his History at the out- break of the war, expecting it to be a great one and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, we should naturally infer that he continued the compilation and composition throughout the war, and in fact—as it is clearly unfinished—until his death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was never completely revised, and it is natural that one can find traces of the different dates at which the several portions were composed. Evidence of this kind has been brought forward in support of differ- ent hypotheses as to the composition of the work. The most famous of these was that put forth by F. W. Ullrich in his Beitrage sur Erklérung des Thu- kydides,.Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained _that. Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history ot \> the Archidamian War (432-421 B.c.), formed a sepa- _

. rate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias , ‘and the Sicilian Expedition, | “and that the phrase “this war” in the earlier books refers to the Ten Years’ War only.

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with the words, “The same Thucydides recorded the events in order, reckoning by summers and winters,}

1 His division of the year corresponds to the actual con- ditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times: summer

xiii

INTRODUCTION

until the fall of Athens.” But he adds, “The war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone who declines to count the interval of truce as war is mistaken;’’ which sounds very much like the opening of a second volume of a work that falls into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War (I.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval between 421 and 416 B.c.; but that it received im- portant additions after the fall of Athens seems certain, e.g. 1. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So much may well be admitted for Ullrich’s hypothesis, but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of the whole work, need not be considered to have been originally a separate treatise, but only to have received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph from Classen’s introduction to Book V outlines a probable order for the growth of the history which seems reasonable : “Though I am convinced that the whole work was written in the shape in which we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, and that Thucydides was called away from life when engaged in the last revision and combination of the portions which he had noted down and sketched in outline from the beginning of the war,

—the larger half, including both spring and autumn—cover- ing the time approximately from March to October, winter from November to February,

xiv

INTRODUCTION

yet I do not believe that all parts of the work re- ceived an equally thorough review. I think that the masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, was completed with the full knowledge of the disas- trous result of the twenty-seven years’ war; that then the history of the ten years’ war and the Si- cilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the results of laborious inquiry were already at hand more or less perfectly worked out, received their final touches; and that after this, before the thread of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic- Decelean War, the intervening period of the cipjvy UrovAos was described.”

The most interesting testimony as to the recog- nition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times is Lucian’s statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demo- sthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, and among others of the later historians who emu- lated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influ- enced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quin- tilian’s oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis et semper instans stbt Thucydides, shows his appreciation. In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay: “There is no prose composition, not even the De Corona, which | place so high as the Seventh Book of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human art”; again, “The retreat from Syracuse—Is it or

XV

INTRODUCTION

is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?” ; and still again, “He is the greatest historian that ever lived.” John Stuart Mill said, “The most powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps in all literature is the account of the Sicilian cata- strophe in his Seventh Book.” The Earl of Chatham, on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, “left to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the classic authors, but made it his particular desire that Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should be the first Greek which his son read after coming to college.” And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: “ For close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never been surpassed ; and indeed they may be considered as having reached the highest excellence of which the human mind is capable in that department.”

In the ordinary narration of events the style of Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong con- trast with this generally simple and lucid form of statement is his style in describing battles and other critical events, in generalizations, and especially in the speeches; here the statement is often so concise and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucy- dides was not the first to use speeches as a means of vivid presentation of important crises and the actors in them; for that he had the precedent of Homer and the Attic drama, But he used this

xvi

INTRODUCTION

means with such impressive effect and success as to induce frequent imitation in later historical writing in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the Introduction (1. xxii. 1): “ As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under con- sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time | have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.” As a natural result the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the struc- ture of the sentences and in particular expressions— in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but at the same time the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordin- arily effective; here, as in his most striking narra- tions, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it. Oras Classen said, “ Without our own choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of

XVii

INTRODUCTION

interests, and are put in the position to form judg- ment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself add a word of comment.”

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides’ great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder what his nationality was did he not frequently sub- scribe himself ‘Thucydides the Athenian.’’ Histo- rians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of battles read as if he himself had been present. He dramatises history by placing events in such juxta- position that a world of moral is conveyed without a word of comment; for example, when the funeral oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed by the description of the plague, the disgraceful Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He packs his language so full of meaning that at times a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a sentence. ‘Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most,’ and however much we regret

XViii

INTRODUCTION

his reserve, since for much that he might have told us we have no other witnesses, we come more and more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no historian ever excelled such passages as those where the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is por- trayed (vu. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the departing Athenian host is described (vu. ]xxv), or where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the final sentence: “Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.”

xix

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according to Hude, the most important :—

Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century. Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th century.

A Cisalpinus sive Italus, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), parchment, 11th or 12th century.

B Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, llth century.

C Laurentianus, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2), parchment, 11th century.

EK Palatinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th century.

F Augustanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th century.

G

M

No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as to deserve preference before all others; but of the two families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. Hude’s preference is for Laurentianus ; Classen’s, following Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a special value as coming perhaps from a different copy.

ComPLETE EDITIONS

Aldus: Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio; scholia 1503.

Stephanus: Paris, 1564, folio; with scholia and Valla’s Latin version made in 1452. The second edition (1588) is the source of the Vulgate.

I. Bekker: Oxford, 1821, 4 vols., with scholia and Duker’s Latin version. Also Ed. ster. altera, Berlin, 1832 (746, ’68).

xxi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Poppo: Leipzig, 1821-40, 11 vols. (prolegomena, commen- tary, etc.).

Poppo: Minor edition, Leipzig, 1843-51, 4 vols.; revised 1875-85 by Stahl.

Goeller: Leipzig, 1826 and 1836, 2 vols., annotated.

Arnold: London and Oxford, 1830-39, 3 vols., annotated.

Didot : Paris, 1840, text with Latin version by Haase.

Bloomfield : London, 1842-43, 2 vols., annotated.

Kriiger: Berlin, 1846-7 and 1858-61, 2 vols., annotated.

Boehme: Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated ; new edition revised by Widmann.

Classen: Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated ; revised by Steup.

Stahl: Editio ster. Leipzig, 1873-74, 2 vols., introduction, text and adnotatio critica. .

Van Herwerden: Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical notes.

Jones: Oxford, 1898, 2 vols., text.

Hude: Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes.

EpITIons oF SINGLE Books

Shilleto: Books I and II, London, 1872-3, with critical and explanatory notes.

Schoene: Books I and II, Berlin, 1874, text and critical notes.

Croiset : Books I and II, Paris, 1886, annotated.

Rutherford : Book IV, London, 1889.

American ‘‘ College Series,” Boston, based on Classen-Steup : Morris, Book I, 1887; Fowler, V, 1888; Smith, III, 1894; VI, 1913; VII, 1886.

Lamberton: Books VI and VII, New York, 1886; II and III, 1905.

Holden: Book VII, Cambridge, 1891.

Goodhart : Book VIII, London, 1893.

Marchant: Book II, London, 1893; VI, 1905; VII, 1910.

Spratt: Book III, Cambridge, 1896; IV, 1912; VI, 1905.

Fox: Book III, Oxford, 1901.

Tucker: Book VIII, London, 1908.

Mills: Book II, Oxford, 1913. e

xxii

THUCYDIDES

BOOK I

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1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides

is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in footnotes.

2

THUCYDIDES

BOOK |

I, Tuucypipes, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another. He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. For this was the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, it was impossible to get clear information on account of lapse of time ; but from evidence which, on pushing my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can trust, I think that they were not really great either as regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but that migrations were frequent in former times, each tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were

3

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THUCYDIDES

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1 So Ullrich: peroixias és Mn.

BOOK I. um. 1-6

forced to do so by any people that was more numer- ous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the people did not mingle with one another without fear, either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet without walls, when some invader might come and despoil them. And so, thinking that they could ob- tain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and for this reason were not strong as regards either the size of their cities or their resources in general. And it was always the best of the land that was most subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Pelo- ponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that accrued to some communities on account of the fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels whereby they were ruined, and at the same time these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same people always. And here is an excellent illustration of the truth of my statement that it was owing to these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when they were driven out of their own countries by war or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the very earliest times made the city still greater in the

5

THUCYDIDES

> , / > / \ / cA éroincav wAnbe avOpwTav THVY TOALY, WOTE kal és “lwviav totepov ws ovX iKaVis OVENS THS > a > ‘ ge/

Attikns atrotkias e€eTreunrpav.

III. Androl &€ pos Kai Tdde TOY Tada@v acGE- veav ovx HKloTa* mpo yap TaV TpwiKay ovdéev / , A > / oie , daiverar mpotepov Kown épyacapyevn n EAdas* Soxet 8€ pot, ovdé Todvopa TodTo Evymaca Te elyev, GAXA TA ev TPO” EAAnVOS Tod Aeveadio- vos Kal mdvu ovdée Elva Hh érikANoLs avTN, KaTAa GOvn S¢ ddXa@ TE Kal TO HeAacyiKov ert wreia Tov

J je A \ bd] , / a ad EQAUTO@Y THV ETMVULLAY Tmapéye Gan, EAAnVvos 88 kal Tav Taidwv avtod év TH POi@tids iayu- / \ DJ , > \ b] > 2] / > cdvTwv, Kal émayopuévwv avtovs ée7 whedia es \ v / ’ ec / \ ” a Tas GNAas Tones, Kal’ Exadotovs pev dn TH éutdia padrov KareicGar “EXXqvas, ov pevtor ToAXOD Ye Xpovou edvvaTO Kal GTacWW exVLKHCAL. a \ / ad a \ Texpnptot o€ padioTa Ounpos. TorAAo yap Botepov ere Kal Tov TpwrKady yevopevos ovdapod ef 1 \ / Inf 1S ” 7 ottw! tovs Evpravtas wvopacey ovd addouUS i rods peta “Ayirréas ex THs POcw@tL60s, oltep \ n i ae! \ \ > a Kat mpa@to.” EdAnves Hoav, Aavaovs 6€ &v Tots v ». Cy J / Vi \ > A > reat Kal Apyelous cat “Ayatovs avaxanel. ov unv ovdé BapBdpovs ecipnxe Sia TO pnde “EX- Anvds Tw, os éuol Soxei, avtimadov és év dvopa ; , e > = € Y 7 dtoxexpic0at., of & ovv ws Exactor “ EdAXAnves KaTa TONELS TE OoOL GAAHAwY EvViecay Kal Evp- mavtes batepov KrAnOévtes ovdev mpo TaV Tpat- nav d¢ acbéveray Kal aperkiav GdAdAnA@Y aOpoot

1 Added by Reiske.

BOOK I. n. 6-1. 4

number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia.

III. The weakness of the olden times is further proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, this title did not even exist, and that the several tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their own names to the several districts ; but when Hellen and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a long time before the name could prevail among them all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer; for, though his time was much later even than the Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or indeed of any of them except the followers of Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one common name by way of contrast. However this may be, those who then received the name of Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city by city, according as they understood one another’s speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, on account of weakness and lack of intercourse

7

THUCYDIDES

, érpafav. adda Kal TavTny THY oTpaTelav Oa- Aadoon On TAELW Ypw@pevor Evv7TrOov.

IV. Mivws yap wadaitatos @yv axon topev % 5) / x nr a € nf vauTLKOV exTHTAaTO Kal THS voy EAAnWKHS Oa- / > \ “ b / \ A“ / Adoons etl TrelaoTOv éexpatynce Kai THV KuKXa- / \ \ A n dav vnowv hpEe Te Kal olKLoTNS TP@TOS TOV / > / na > / \ \ mretoTov éyéveto, Kapas éfeXadcas Kai Tovs ~ r , / éauTov Taidas Hye“ovas éyKaTacTHaas* TO TE z ! e Seles l 2 A / 24? AnoTLKdY, ws elKos, KAOnpEL Ex THS Oaddoons ép ef 29 7 a \ a 7 dcov édvvaTo, TOD Tas Tpocddous paAXov Lévat auT@. 7 \ A V. Of yap “EAXAnves TO dAa Kai TaV Bap- Bdapwv of te év TH HITrelpw Tapaladdcoton Kal 4 / > > \ A a Scot vicous elyov, érerdn npEavTo wadXov Tre- cal \ 3 b] 3 4 > ‘h \ patovaGar vavolv é7 adXAnXOUS, ETPATTOVTO TpOsS / a cal AnoTEelayv, NyouMev@v avdpav ov TaV advvaTaTa- n / nm lal TwY Képdous TOD apETEepov avTa@V veka Kal Tots / a \ / acbevéot tTpobis, Kal Wpoomimtovtes ToXETLY \ > 4 ATELXLTTOLS KA KATA KOpmas OlKoUMEVaLs HpTraloy Kal Tov weloTov Tov Blov évTevGev étroLovYTO, > / / fal ovK €xovTOs Tw alayUYnY To’TOU Tov Epyou, / \ / a A a hépovtos O€é Te Kal ddEns warrov: Snrovor 5é TOV TE NTELPWTAV TIVES ETL Kal VOY, Ols KOTMOS KAADS TovTo Opav, Kal of madatol TOY ToLnTa@V Tas fal / fal MUCTELS TOV KATATAECOVTMY TravTaYOU opOLws a / e = épwTavtes el ANTTAL EloLV, WS OUTE MY TuVOavoV- / \ > D4 U tat atakiovvTwy To Epyov, ols TE EmLpEdes En

8

BOOK I. 11. 4-v. 2

with one another. And they united even for this expedition only when they were now making con- siderable use of the sea.

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself master of a very great part of what is now called the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving out the Carians and establishing his own sons in them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring that his revenues should come to him more readily.

V. It should be explained that in early times both the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the mainland near the sea,! as well as those on the islands, when once they began more frequently to cross over in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was their own private gain and the support of their weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of villages, they pillaged them and got most of their living from that source. For this occupation did not as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some- thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice, even at the present day, of some of the peoples on the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc- cessful in this business, as well as by the words of the early poets, who invariably ask the question of all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates,? the inference being that neither those whom they ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots. 2 cf. Homer, y 73; « 252,

VOL. 1. cde

THUCYDIDES

3 eldévar ovK overdifovtwv. édAnfovto S€ Kal Kat / / la nr HTELpov GNANAOUS. Kal MEYPL TODOE TrOAAA TIS e777 / A A / / “4 EddAddos TO Tadkalw TpoTwM VvéweTaAL TeEpi Te >’ U Aoxpovs tovs ‘Oforas wal AitwXdods cal ’Axap-

al / a vavas Kal THY TAUTN NTrELpoV' TO TE TLONpOpopel- aQat TovTOLs TOis NTELPWTaLs aTrO THS Tadalas

, b] / ANTTELAS EMMEMEVHKED. a \ \ ,

VI. aca yap 7 ‘“Enndas éordnpodope Sa Tas > / 3 / \ > b] A > apapKTous TE OlKNTELS KAaL OVK achadrels Trap

\ adAnrous éepddous, Kal EvvyOn thy diartav pel cd > / iA e / rn 2 OTAwY éroincavTo WoTrep of BapBapot. onpetov na a er € — sme 8 éott\rabra ‘ris “EXdddos ets ob Two vepoueva a Fi 3 (T@V ToTeE Kal)és TaYTAas Opoiwy SiatTNnUaT@V. év Qn cal N rn / / tois mpatot O€ "AOnvaio: Tov te aldnpov KaTé- / A / \ Gevto Kal avetpévn TH Siaitn és TO TpUpEepw@Tepov peTéoTynoav. Kal ot tpeacBuTEpot avTois TaV Ev- 4 \ \ e / > \ , Sarmovev 1a TO aBpodiattov ov ToOAVS YpoVOS érrelon XIT@VAS TE ALVODS éeTTavaaVTO dopodvuTES Kal ypvo@v teTTiyov évépoer KpwRUov avadov- lal ’ lal n an > , Ka \ pevot TOV Ev TH Kehadryn TpLXa@V' ad ov Kal "lever tov o BuTépou a To Evyyeves em vy TOUS Tpe pous Kata To Evyyeves €tr 4 TON avTn 1 oKEUV? KaTécXeEV etpia & av nH y xev. per pla n \ r U lal écOAntt Kal és Tov viv TpoTovy mpato. Aaxkedat-

, b] / » Naw 2 Ye oF \ \

foviol EXPNTAVTO Kal Es TA AXA TPOS TOUS TOA-

\ , Aovs of Ta pellw KEeKTHMEVOL icodialTOL wadLOTA 5 KatéaTynoav. éyupveOnoay TE TPMTOL Kai es TO

Io

BOOK I. v. 2-v1. 5

censure it who are concerned to have the informa- tion. On the mainland also men plundered one another ; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders’ habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old freebooting life.

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms because the places where they dwelt were unpro- tected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe ; and in their everyday life they regularly went armed just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evi- dence that at one time similar modes of life pre- vailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it was only recently that their older men of the wealthier class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper as a brooch;! and this same dress obtained for a long time among the elderly men of the Ionians also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. An unpretentious costume after the present fashion was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in general their wealthier men took up a style of living that brought them as far as possible into equality with the masses. And they were the first to bare their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint

1 The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada

seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us.

II

THUCYDIDES

\ > , / \ A / davepov aroduvtes Nima peta tod yuyvalecBat nrelavtTo. TO dé wadat Kai ev TO ‘OdvpTLK@ 5] a , ” \ \ > a G49 ayave Sial@pata éyovtes TeEpt TA aldota ot aOdn-

{> 2 / \ > bE A bp] \ / Tal nywvilovto, Kal ov TONG ETN ETrELOH TETTAUD- by4 \ \ > nn / »” ? aA Tat éte 6€ Kal év tots BapBapois eotww ols vo, Kal padusta Tois "Aclavois, TuypHs Kal wads GOXa tiPerat, cat SveSwpévor TodTO Sp@awv. ToAXa / \ 8S dv cal adda Tis atrodeiEeve TO Tadatov “EX-

\ € / a a lal / AnVLKOY OmoLOTpoTTAa T@ vdv BapRapix@ srartw- MeVOD. |

a / VII. Tay S€ roXewv doar péev vewtata oKicOn- / ’ / aA cav Kal On TAWLLOTEPwWY OYTwY TrEpLoVaLaS Lan- > al al lal Rov éxovcat ypnudtov, éw avTols Tots aiyrarots > / \ / \ > \ > / éxtiCovto Kal Teiyeos TOUS LaP uous ateddpBavov

, a \ éurropias Te Evexa Kal THS Tpos TOUS TpoTotKoUS 4 > 4 € \ \ \ \ / éxactot iayvos: ai 6€ tadaal dua THY AnoTELaY s \ \ > / > \ / lal éml woAv avTicxyovoay amo Oaracons waddov

7 a lal wxiaOnacav, at Te €v Tais vycos Kal év Tais / 54 \ > rn nretpors (Epepov yap AAXAjAOUS TE KaL TOV AXrOV 7 Scot bytes ov Oadacolot KATW @KOUY), Kal MEX PL al / TovoE ETL AV@KLTLEVOL ELoLY. \ aA VIIL. Kal ody jocov AnoTai Hoav oi vnotwTat, ra , 2 Kapés te dvtes cal Poivixes. obTot yap bn Tas TrEloTAS TOV viTwY @KnTaVY. papTUpLov Oé / \ / ¢ va? / > a Anrov yap Kabapouévns vo “AOnvaiwr év TOS5¢€ a / \ al “ > n 4 T@ ToAcu@ Kal TaV Onka@v avatpeOeca@y, daar Roav tav teOvewtwyv €v TH ViTw, UTEP Husov

12

BOOK I. vi. 5—vitt. 1

themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in the contests, and it is not many years since the practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the con- testants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other customs similar to those of the Barbarians of the present day.

VII. However, the cities which were founded in more recent times, when navigation had at length become safer, and were consequently beginning to have surplus resources, were built right on the sea- shore, and the isthmuses! were occupied and walled off with a view to commerce and to the protection of the several peoples against their neighbours. But the older cities, both on the islands and on the main- land, were built more at a distance from the sea on account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day they lie inland.

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoe- nicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war” and the graves of all who had ever died on the island were re- moved, over half were discovered to be Carians,

1 7.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, con- nected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then

walled off as Epidamnus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (Iv. exx. 3), 2 In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.c. cf. III. civ.

13

THUCY DIDES

Kapes éfavycar, roo Oevres TH TE of agi TOD Orrov EvyvteOaupévn Kal TH TpoT@ G viv Ett Oamtovowv.

Kataortaytos be tou Mivw vavtixov Teoipe- TEPAa eryeveTo map: adda rous (0 yap €x TOV DIT OY KaKkoupyol avéoTnoay UT avrov, Ore Ep Kal Tas TOANAS AUTOV Kar@eice), Kal ol Tapa Oddaccav dvOpoT ot paAAov On Tv KTHOW TOV Xpnparav TOLOUMLEVOL BeBavorepov @KOUV, KAL TLVES KAL TelXn mepteBadrovTo 1 @s TOV LMTEPOL EauT@V cpeyve- pevot’ ep lépevo yap T@VY KEepo@v ot TE HaaoUS Umrépevov TOV Kpelac ovey dovAelav, of te Suva- TOTEPOL ‘mrepiovatas EXOVTES mpoo-eT oLovvTo vmn- KoouS TaS €AdaooUS TONES. Kal EV TOVT® TO TpOT@ paddov dn Ovtes UoTepov Ypovw emt wien eoTpaTevoay.

. Aya pepvov Té you SoKEl TOV TOTE Suvapel Slt Kal ov TOTOUTOY TOS Tuvddpew bpxous KaTehnppevous tous Enevns punoThypas dy@v TOV otoXov ayerpalt. éyovar Sé Kal of Ta Gadeatata TleAorrovynciov pin mapa TOV TpoTepov de- Serypevor) Tlédomd TE ™ parov mwAnOEL XPnHaTOV, & ArOev ex THS Acias éxov és dvOpwrrous am Opous, Ovvapl TepuToung apLevov Thy erovupiay THS xo pas émnduv dvta buws axel, Kal toTepov Tols

1 Aude reads zepieSddovro with C,.

EID ee) SS SSS ee

1 According to the post-Homeric legend, all who paid their court to Helen engaged to defend the man of her

14

BOOK I. vu. 1-1x. 2

being recognized by the fashion of the armour found buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which is that still in use among them. |

But when the navy of Minos had been established, navigation between various peoples became safer— for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, and then he proceeded to colonize most of them —and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to acquire property more than before and to become more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that they were growing richer than before, began also to put walls around their cities. Their more settled life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful men, with their enlarged resources, were able to make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, when they had at length more completely reached this condition of affairs, they made the expedition against Troy.

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon surpassed in power the princes of his time that he was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much because Helen’s suitors, whom he led, were bound by oath to Tyndareus.! It is said, furthermore, by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditional accounts from men of former times, that it was by means of the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into the midst of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his name to the country, and that yet greater things

choice against all wrong. ef. Isoc. x.40; Paus. 11. xx. 9; Apollod. m1. x. 9.

¥5

THUCYDIDES

, , 4 a exyovors ete peifw EvveveyOjvat, Evpvabéws peév ’ A b lal € \ ¢ fal ’ , év tH ’Attixn v7o0 “Hpaxredav azrofavortos, "Atpéws O€ pntpos adeXdhod dvtos av’T@ Kal ért- pews O€ NTPOS S$ QUT® Kal é7t / > / 23 > / / tpéyravtos Evpuvadéws, or’ eotpateve, Muxnvas \ > a ’ al Te Kal THY apXnV KaTa TO oiKelov 'ATpet (TUYXa- \ vew 5€ avTov devyovta Tov matépa Sia Tov Xpucinmov Oavatov), Kal ws OvKETL avexwpnoeV Evpuadevs, Bovropévor cat Tav Muxnvaiorv PoBo “ ¢ lal \ ee \ lal > tov ‘Hpaxrerdav cal dua duvatov doxovvta eivat \ fal , ral , Kal TO TAHGos TeEPepaTrevxoTta TaV Muxnvatov Te \ x . Kat dcwv Evpuabevs jpye tHv Bacireiav “Atpéa maparafPely kal tov Ilepoedav tovs Hedomidas na wee peifous KatactThvar. & pot Soxet “Ayapéuvwv \ \ aA \ iA 3 \ / lal TapadaBov Kal vavTiK@ € Gua emt TrEOY TOV ” > “2 \ / > / \ / arrwv layuoas THY TTPATELAY OV YapLTL TO TEOV a / \ / , \ i bobo Evvayayov tromoacGa. gaivetar yap \ 4 > vavol Te TAElaTaLs AUTOS AdiKopevos Kai ApKact , / lal mpootapacyav, ws “Opunpos TovTo ded7jwxer, et la ’ n z Tw ikavos TeKuNpla@oat. Kal €v TOD GKNTTPOV ¢ a f ” IEtN “ce 3 a / dua TH Tapadoce elpnxey avtov “ ToAAHaL v7)- cowor Kal “Apyei wavtl avacce’ ovK« ay ov / y” rn / 2 \ > A vicwv é&~ TeV Teplotkidwy (avTat bé€ ovK ap \ 3 > / x > / > / \ TOAAAL Elev) NITELPWTNS WY EKPATEL, EL LN TL KAL x / a vauTixoy elyev. elxdtew S€ ypn Kal TavTn TH \ \ a gTpaTela ola Hv Ta TPO AUTH.

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche, was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their mother Hippodameia.

16

BOOK I, ix. 2-5

fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eu- rystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, Atreus, his mother’s brother, who chanced to have been banished by his father for the death of Chry- sippus,' was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman; and when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accord- ance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a man of power and had won the favour of the mul- titude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And so the house of Pelops became greater than the house of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon had inherited all this, and at the same time had be- come strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he was able to collect his armament, not so much by favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest number of ships, and that he had others with which to supply the Arcadians,? as Homer testifies, if he is sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the account of the delivery of the sceptre,? that Aga- memnon “ruled over many islands and all Argos.” Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been lord of any islands except those on the coast, and these would not be “many.” And it is from this expedition that we must judge by conjecture what the situation was before that time.

2 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612, 3 cf. Homer, B 101-109.

17

THUCYDIDES

Le \ = VAe Al a X. Kat éte pev Muxivar pixpov nv, 7) et TeToV : a \ > f a s rote TOALo La vov pH aioypewr SoKEl Eivat, ovK tal , 4 3 / ‘ axpiBel av TLS TNMEL@ KpwpEVvOS aTLaTOLN BN rn e - yevérOat Tov aTdNOV TOGODTOY GaoV ol TE TOLNTAl ¢ , / cipykact Kal 6 Aoyos KaTéxet. Aaxedatpoviwy A / / pevt yap ei 4 rods epnuwbetn, AerpOein dé Ta e \ \ rn ips \ b / \ x Te (epa Kal THs KaTacKEUNS Ta Ebaby, TOAAHY av s > / fol / / al OlUaL ATLA TLAV TNS Suvapews TpoeNGovTos TOAOV rat , fal ypovov Tois érerta Tpos TO KAEOS aUTOY elval a / \ (kaitot TleXorovvijcov tov mévte Tas dvo potpas fol / la) la vépovras THS Te EvpTrdans tyyobvTar Kal ToV Ew / A a Pi BA / Evpuayov Todkdwy: o“ws dé, ovTe Evvoltxiaberons n e ad \ rn THs? wodews OTE Lepols KaL KATATKEVALS TONU- / \ nr lal Tedéor Yonoaperys, KATA Kopas € TH Tara@ rt ¢€ / , ’

Tihs ‘EdAdbos tpoTe@ oixicBeions, haivorT av vTro- , > / \ \ > \ lal , Scectépa), AOnvaiwy dé 76 ato TovTO TadovTwy

, x \ , Wee Mae A Surraciav av thy Svvamy eixalecPar ato THs lat > a / / pavepas drvews Tis TOAEws 7) EoTLY. oOvKOUY aT L- lal Dy "% »9\ \ ” a / al oTely elkos ovde Tas ders THY TONEWY paXXOV a / oxotrel %) Tas Suvapuers, vopitew bé Thy oTpatelav / / a fol éxeivny peyioTny pev yevécOar THY TPO avTijs, / 5 4 we , Revrropévny Sé TaV viv, TH “Opnpov ad Trouncer et lal \ al Te xpy KavTadOa moTeveEL, HY elKos éml TO metfov \ n <4 \ pev ToLnTHY OvTa KOTMHTAL, OMwS dé dhaivetat / \ , Kal otTws évdeecTépa. TeToinke yap XLALwV Kai a \ a Staxociwy veav tas pev Borwtav elxoot Kal e \ > 8 a \ be Mir / / éxatov avdpav, tas b€ DidoxtyTov TevTnKovTa, 1 Added by Hude. 2 Added by Stephanus. 18

BOOK I. x. 1-4

X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, or if any particular town of that time seems now to be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to believe that the expedition against Troy was as great as the poets have asserted and as tradition still main- tains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its temples and the foundations of its other buildings, posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, be very loath to believe that their power was as great as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the whole, as well as of their many allies outside ; but still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and has not provided itself with costly temples and other edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, its power would, I think, from what appeared of the city’s ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous or to regard the appearance of cities rather than their power, but to believe that expedition to have been greater than any that preceded it, though falling below those of the present time, if here again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on his showing it was evidently comparatively small. For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has represented the ships of the Boeotians as having one hundred and twenty men each, and those of

19

THUCYDIDES

a e > \ n \ / \ / dnA@v, ws euoi Soxel, Tas peyiotas Kat édayxi- » nr / lal otas' G\Xwy yor peyéOous mépt ev veay KaTa- Noyo ovK euvycOyn. avtepérar b€ OTL Hoav Kal / / > A ® / \ / paxlpor Tavtes, ev Tats DiroxTHTov vavat Se67- / \

AwKev' TOECTAS yap TaVTAas TeETOINKE TOUS TpOT- , / \ > : \ cal KWTOUS. Treplvews O€ OVK ElKOS TOANOUS EvsTrAELY

lal f, lal é€w Tav Baciiéwy Kal TOY pwddLOTAa év TédEL, , / , GArXws TE KaL péANOVTAS TEAAYOS TEpatwaed Oat rn lal \ al feTa TKEVO@Y TONEMLKG@Y OVO av Ta TOLA KaTAa- yy > \ a a , hapKTa eYovTas, AAA TM TAaNAL@ TpoTw@ ANHOTL- , / \ \ Ps > KWTEpOV Taped Kevacpéva. Tpos Tas peyioTas 6 / nr \ nr ovv Kal éhaxiatas vats TO fécov oKOTOUYTL Ov , / \ lol moAXoL haivovtar éovtes, WS ATO TaaHS THS ¢ Los EdAd6os Kowh TEUTOMEVOL. > ? eS lal XI. Aitiov & Hv ovy 7 OrAvyavO pwria ToToUTOV / a \ a > / ’ dcov nH axXpnuatia. THS yap Tpopys amopta Tov Te oTpaTov éAdoow iyayov Kal doov ATLfOY avtobev TodenodvTa Biotevoey, érrerdn 5€ adu- , al / \ \ KOMEVOL ayn expaTynaay (Ojrov S€é- TO yap Epupa rn / , TO OTPATOTEOW OVK ay ETELXLZaYTO), PatvovTaL & ovd évtatv0a Tacn TH Suvdper ypnodpuevol, adda an Ty / mpos yewpylav Ths Nepoovncov tpaTopevor Kat AnoTElay THS Tpodpiys amopia. Kal padXov ot not is tpopis amopig. 3 Kal padrov oi rn lal / \ / ” r Tpaes av’tav dueovrappévon ta déxa ETN avTEtyov rn e , Bia, tois aiet vToXeTTOpmevols avTiTaXoL GVTEs. ‘ / \ > Ss fed »” lal \ Vv meprovalay dé e 7Gov ExovTEs Tpopijs Kal dvTES

20

BOOK Vitex, 4421, 2

Philoctetes as having fifty,! indicating, it seems to me, the largest and the smallest ships ; at any rate, no mention as to the size of any others is made in the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes; for he repre- sents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedi- tion, apart from the kings and those highest in office, especially as they were to cross the open sea with all the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats which were not provided with decks, but were built after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any event, if one takes the mean between the largest ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large number of men went on the expedition, considering that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.2 XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that caused them to take out a comparatively small force, only so large as could be expected to live on the country while at war. And when they arrived and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did, for otherwise they could not have built the defence around their camp—even then they seem not to have used their whole force, but to have resorted to farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scat- tered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field against them during those ten years, being a match for those who from time to time were left in camp. But if they had taken with them an abundant 1 Hom. B 510, 719. 2 The number would be 102,000, #.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men each, 21

THUCYDIDES

€ ¥ / \ / lal \ aOpoo. avev AnoTElas Kal yewpylas Evveyas Top ar Py / 4 bi xa / an Torenov Siépepov, padiws av mayn KpatodvTes ” \ > c , ; \ , A >A elhov, of ye Kal ovy aOpoo, adda péper TO aiel , > A / ’ x / TapovTt avtetyov, Todtopxia 8 av mpooKabefo- / pevolt €v éXdooovi TE XPOVw Kal aTrOVwTEpOY THY / > \ ? , / Tpotav eldov. adda bt aypnuatiav(td Te po 4 > nan > \ > / \ la) b] ToUTwY) acbevh Hv Kai avTa ye 52) TadTa, dvoma- U lal Vs A a oTOTATa TaY Tply yevoueva, dnrODTAL Tois Epryots UTodeéaoTEpa OvTAa THS Pyuns Kal Tov viv Trepl lal \ Ae avTov Sia TOUS TroLNnTasS NOYOU KATETYNKOTOS, \ \ 3 XII. ’Evei cal peta ta Tpwixa 4 “EXXas Ett , / HETAVLTTATO TE KAL KAT@OKLCETO, WATE LN OVYG- > a“ oe \ / an € caca avénOnvar. Te yap uvaywpnots Tov “EX- / /

Ajnveav €& “I\tov ypovia yevouévn Tordra évedy- woe, Kal oTaces ev Tais TOdEoW ws ert TO \ ey 4 > > > 3 / Fy / Toru EeylyvoVvTO, ap wy ExTLTTOVTES TAS TrOAELS

” / \ e a e : a

extiCov. Bowwrtot te yap o. viv éEnkooT@ éTet

peta “IXiov Gdwow é€& “Apyns avactdytes vd

Occcarav thy viv pév Bowtiav, mpotepov bé 4\

/ a / v \ > al Kadpunida,yiv carovpévnv wxnoay (Rv S€ avtav Kal atrobac mos ev TH YR TavTyn TpoTEpov, ag’ wv

en > / a ? a

kat €s "INov €otpatevoav), Awpins Te oydonkosT@ /

érer Evv ‘Hpaxretidars IleXorrovvncov Exyov. uo-

b] a / id a e € \

Ais TE Ev TOAAD® yYpovw novyacaca n EdXXas

, \ > , ’ / > / > /

BeBaiws Kal (ovxéTe aviatamevn) amroixias é€e-

22

BOOK I. x1. 2-xu. 4

supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war continuously, they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city, since even with their forces not united, but with only such part as was from time to time on the spot, they yet held out; whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken _ it in less time and with less trouble. But becausé_of lack of money not only were the undertakings before the Trojan war insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though far more noteworthy than-any~befores-is.shown by the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the tradition about it that now, through the influence of the poets, obtains.

XII. Indeed, even.-after vere war Hellas

was still subject to migrations and in process of settlement, and hence “HE-HSE pet rest and wax stronger. For not only did the return of the Hel- lenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long time, cause many changes; but factions also began to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in con- sequence of these, men were driven into exile and founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly Cadmeis; only a portion of these had been in that land before, and it was some of these who took part in the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the eightieth year after the war, together with the Hera- cleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when painfully and after a long course of time Hellas became permanently tranquil and its population was no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it

23

THUCYDIDES

A 8 \ ’ r \ nw meute, Kat “lwvas pev “A@nvaios kat vnotwTov Tovs Toddovs wxicay, “Itadias 8€ Kal LiKedias

‘ ol ¢ To mAéov IleXotrovynaton tTHS TE GAANS “EXAdOos éoTw & xYwpia. mavta b€ TavTa voTEepovy TaY Tpawixav éxticOn. = € XIII. Avvatwrtépas 5é yiryvomévns tis “EAXddos nr fol al a Kal TOV YpnuaTov THY KTHOW ETL wadAov 7 Tpo- f al TEpov Tolovpevyns Ta TOAAA TuUpavvides ev Tals A / 5 Todeot KabioTaVTO, TOV TpoTodwY perlovwv yi- yvouevwv (mpotepov d€ Hoav émlt pyntols yépact matpikal Bactdetat), vauvTikd te é&nptveTo 7 € n la EAXAds xal THs Oaddoons paddXov avTetyovTo. mp@tor dé KopivOsor Aéyovtar éyyvtata Tov viv \ cal TpoTov petayelploa Ta Tepl Tas vavs Kal TpLN- lal , an ¢ pets mpa@tov év KopivOe tis “EXXdbos éevvauTn- ynOjvar. daivetar 6€ Kal Laptows ’Apewoxrdijs KopivO.0s vaurnyos vats Toujcas Téeooapas: ETH 8 éotl uddtota TplaKkoota és THY TeNEUTHY TODSE lo > a / ToD modéuov, dte “ApervoxAfs Laptous HrOev. vavpaxia Te TadaTtaTn wv topev yiryvetat Ko- / N / 4 \ / \ pwOiwy mpos Kepxupaious: étn 6€ wadtota Kai tavtn é€nxovta Kal Siakdotd éote péexXpL TOV fal la) \ / avtov ypovov. oixovvTes yap THY TOW Oi Ko- pivOcor émt tod icOuod aiei 8) rote éurropiov = fal ¢ / \ / \ a \ / etyov, TOY EXAnvwy TO Taal KaTAa yn Ta ThELw a \ / fal b Nw / }, kata Odraccav, TOV Te EvTos IleXoT7rovYHaoV \ n ” \ Alyse —? 3) ¥5 , kal tov é&w, d1a THs exelvywy Tap addANoOUS ETLLLTYOVTMV, XpHnwacl TE OvvATOL Hoav, ws Kal

24

BOOK I. xu. 4-xm1. 5

began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized Ionia and most of-the7islands ; the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and con- tinued to acquire still more wealth than_ before, along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies ) began to be established in most of the cititewherexs~ before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the modern plan as regards ships and shipping,! and Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, where triremes were built. And it appears that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians, also ; and it was about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that Ameinocles came to the Samians.? The earliest sea- fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the Corinthians against the Corcyraeans ;? and this was two hundred and sixty years before the same date. For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, from the very earliest times they maintained there a market for the exchange of goods, because the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in olden times communicating with one another more by land than by sea, had to pass through their terri- tory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of har- pours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships,

e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4). 8 704 B.O. > 664 B.C.

25

THUCYDIDES

Tols maXaLots Tointais dednrAwTaL’ adveoy yap ? , \ / > / & fh,

eTwvopacav TO ywplov. émrevdyn Te ot “EAANVES cal ” \ a / \

padXXdov émAwlov, TAS VAUS KTHTAaMLEVOL TO ANTTL- \ / Ui

Kov KaOnpovr, Kal éwTOpLoy TAapEeKXoVTES aupoTEepa

»” / Suvatiy éoyov Xpnuatov tmpocod@ THY Tod. ¢ \ ,

6 Kat "Iwow Uotepovy TorV yiyveTat vavTLKoY él Kupou Iepcav tpetov Bacidevovtos kai Kap- Bvcov tov viéos avtov, Tis Te Kal’ éauTovs Garacons Kip morepmotvtes expatnoay twa ypovov. Kal Ilodvepatyns, Ldpouv tupavyay ért * a / v lal , KapBvcovu, vavtiK@ toyvav adrXas TE TOV VHNTwY e / 3 / We / id \ > / UmnKoous éToijncato Kal Prverav éehwv aveOnxe

re wed a / a T@ Amod\XAove TO Anrio. Bawxats te Maccanriav , geld lal oixifovtes Kapyndovious évixwy vavyayoortes. 4 % cal an cal XIV. Avvatetata yap tTavTa TeV vavTiKaoY 2 / \ % la) a a hv. gaivetar 6€ Kal Tavta, moddais yeveais / lal lal votepa yevoueva TOV TpwlLKav, TpLnpEect pev OXé- / >] \ yals Yp@meva, TEVTNKOVTEpOLS O ETL Kal ToLOLS 2 waxpols éEnptupéva HoTeEp Exeiva. OALYOV TE TPO eC r \ lad / / A \ tav Mnédixev cat tod Aapetov Pavatou, ds peta / nr / KapBvonv Iepoav éBacirevce, tpinpers epi TE Yixedlayv toils Tupavvots és TAGs éyévovto Kal n \ al \ r — Kepxupaios tadta yap Tedevtaia mpo THs Eép- , / A Eou otpatelas vauTiKa a&iodoya év TH “ENXaOu , a \ \ ’ rn 3 xatéoTn. Aiyiwwhtar yap Kat “A@nvaiot, Kal

1 cf. Hom. B 570; Pind. Ol. xiii. 4. 2 559-529 B.c. 8 532-522 B.c. Cf. Tit. Civ. 5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.c.

26

BOOK I, xu. 5—x1v. 3

been shown even by the early poets, who called the place “ Wealthy Corinth.”! And when navigation grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by land, raised their city to great power by means of their revenues. The I[onians, too, acquired a power- ful navy later, in the time of Cyrus,” the first king of the Persians, and of Cambyses his son; and waging war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cam- byses,? was strong in sea-power and subdued a num- ber of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo.‘ Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing Massalia,® conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets ; and even these, we learn, though they were formed many generations later than the Trojan war, were provided with only a few triremes, but were still fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary long boats,® like the navies of that earlier time. In- deed, it was only a little before the Persian war and the death of Darius,’ who became king of the Per- sians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans ; and these were the last navies worthy of note that were established in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime

§ wAoia, usually contrasted with war-ships (tp:qpes), but here marked as ships of war by the epithet uaxpa, though

probably differing little except in size from trading- vessels. 7 485 B.C,

27

THUCYDIDES

/ v / a \ 4 \ oitives addot, Bpayéa €KEKTHVYTO Kal TOUTWY TA > ’ A ToAAa TeVvTNKOVTEpoUS’ Oe TE a ov 'AOnvaious ol 7 > / r OcuictoKANs enercev Aiywntats modenovvtas, rn / % \ kal dua tov BapBapov mpocboximov dvtos, Tas vavs Toincaclal, alomep Kal evavpaynoay: Kal 3 \ , avTat ovTw elyov dia Tdons KaTATTpwLaTa. \ = XV. Ta peév ody vavtixa Tov ‘EXXANvev Tot- a \ o avta Hv, Ta Te TadXala Kai Ta VaTEpoy yevopeva. ioyuv O€ TEpleTTOLnTAaVTO Guws OVK ELayioTHY Oi , > a , , \ TPOTTXOVTES AUTOLS ‘YpHUdTwY TE Tpocddw Kal v > ia) > / LY \ / adrwv apyn eTLTAEOVTES YAP TAS VHTOUS KAaTE- / \ ee a otTpépovto, Kal pddiota door un SiapKh elxor / \ cal \ / i<4 x / ywopav. Kata ynv de TOAEMOS, OOev Tis KaV OUVA- \ / pls TrepleyéveTo, ovdsis Evvéctn: wavtes b€ Hoar, \ / \ e / \ dgoL Kal eYEVOYTO, TPOS OMopovs TOvS aoeETépousS ExadoTols, Kal exdnuous oTpatelas TOAV ATO THIS € lal > , ” lel > 3 lal e éauT@v ém addwv Katactpodn ove é&joay oi a > \ / \ \ , EdAnves. ov yap EvverotnKecav pos Tas peyi- , . , 23 > > <3 \ “a. oTas ToAELS UTIKOOL, OVD av avTOL aTO THs lons \ , > a ae , \ KOWaS OTpaTElas ETrOLOUVYTO, KAT GAXAous 6é cal id 4 4 ’ / 3 / HaGAAOV ws ExXaTTOL OL AaaTUYELTOVES eTTONELOUY. / + FS \ ( / \ ‘ / pdriota O€ és TOV TdNaL TOTE YEvopEvov) TOAELOV , a Xarkidéwy cai ’Epetpidv cat To aXXo “EAXANviKOv és Evppaytiav éxatépwv SueoTn.

1 Referring to Xerxes’ invasion. This Aeginetan war ig referred to in ch. xli. 2,

28

BOOK I. xiv. 3-xv. 3

powers, the fleets they had acquired were incon- siderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys ; and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and were also expecting the Barbarians,! built their fleet, at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships with which they fought at Salamis. And these vessels were still without decks throughout their length.

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both those of early and those of later times; nevertheless those who gave attention to such matters acquired not a little strength by reason both of revenue of money and of sway over others. For they—and especially the peoples whose own territory was insuffi- cient—made expeditions against the islands and sub- jugated them. But by land no wars arose from which any considerable accession of power resulted; on the contrary, all that did occur were border wars with their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far from their own country for the subjugation of others were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they had not yet been brought into union as subjects of the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord make expeditions in common as equal allies; it was rather against one another that the neighbouring peoples severally made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians,? that all the rest of Hellas took sides in alliance with the one side or the other.

2 The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf Hdt. v. xcix.; Strabo, x. i. 11); usually placed in the seventh century, but by Curtius in the eighth (see Hermes, x. pp. 220 ff.).

29

THUCYDIDES

XVI. ’Emeyéveto 5€ addols TE AXOOL KwAU- pata py avénOhva, cal “loot mpoxwpnoavtoy éml péya Tov Tpaypatwov Kodpos cai n Lepoixn é£ovoia Kpoicov cabedodca Kal boa évtos” AXvos Tmotauov pos Oddaccay, émETTPATEVGE Kal TAS év TH Hreipw ToAELs ebovAwoe, Aapetos Te VaTEpov T@ Dowixv vavTiK@ KpaTav Kal Tas vycous.

XVII. Tépavvol te 6001 Hoav év tTais “EXAnu- Kais ToOAEct, (TO ef EavT@Y LOVvOV) TpoopwpeEVoL ES Te (TO c@pua),Kal és TO Tov idiov oiKov afew be dodarelas Ocov édvvavtTo pddtoTa Tas TOXELS @Kouv, empaxOn Te ovdev an’ adtav Epyov ak.o- Royov, ef a El TL TPOS TEpLolKOUS TOUS aUTaY éxdotots.: ovtw tavtaxobev 7 EndXas eri trodvv Ypovoy KaTELYETO NTE KOLWH Pavepov pNnoev KaT- epyalecOal, Kata TOdELS TE ATOAMOTEpA ElvaL.

XVIII. ’Ezrecd2) S€ of te “AOnvaiwy tupavvot Kal of €x THs addAns “EAXdbos ert TOAD Kai Tplv TupavvevOeians of TAEloTOL Kal TeAEUTALOL TAY Tav év Suedia vd Aaxedaipovioy KatedvOnoav:} » yap Aaxedaipov pera Tv KTiow \TaV voP évorxovvtov ait Aawpiav) él mreiatov av icwev Xpovov oTacidcaca Guws ex TAaXaLTAaTOV Kal nuvouynOn Kal alel atupdvvevtos Hv: ETN Yap

1 After éxaorois the MSS. have of yap év SixeAia em) wrelorov éxépnoay Suvduews, for those in Sicily advanced to a very great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most editors. 2 Hude omits with E.

30

BOOK I. xvi.-xvin. 1

XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different localities met with obstacles to their continuous growth; for example, after the Ionians had attained great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after subduing Croesus! and all the territory between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands also.?

XVII. The tyrants, moreover—whenever there were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement of their own families, in the administration of their cities made security, so far as they possibly could, their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy of mention was accomplished by them, except per- chance by individuals in conflict with their own neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long time kept from carrying out in common any notable undertaking, and also its several states from being more enterprising.

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)—at least most of them and the last that ever ruled, if we except those in Sicily—were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit it, was, for the longest period of all the places of which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained good laws at an earlier time than any other land, and has always been free from tyrants; for the

1 546 B.O. 2 493 B.c, 31

THUCYDIDES

b / U Pre / / > \ €OTL LANOTA TETPAKOTLA KAL OALY@ TAELW ES THY \ ral lal / ? > z TedeuTIY TODSE TOU TroAéuov, ad ov Aaxedar- A a / aA pOvloL TH AUTH ToALTELa Yp@vTaL’ Kai dv aUTO , \ yi a vy U , duvapevot Kal Ta €v Tals adXaLs TOAEGL KaOLaTA- \ A gay. peta O€ THY TOV TUPavYwWY KaTaddVoOW EK Ths “EXXdSdos ov ToAXOls ETeow Botepov Kai % ev an \ ? , Mapadau payn Mydwv rpos APnvatous éyéverto. 5 u be ” , SE LA Wal e Ba B a ext O€ eres peT avTny addis 0 BapBapos TO / > \ / peyaro otorw ert THY “EdXddda SovAwoopeEVos x \ / / > f nrOev. Kal peyaddrouv Kivdvvou émixpewacbevTos / / A , ¢ of te Aaxedatpovioe Tov EvpToNeunoavTwy ‘EX- / ’ Anvov nyncavtTo Suvapet TpovyorvTes, Kal ot AOn- vaio. érriovt@y TaV Mndwyv dvavonOévtes éxdi7rEiv TY TOL Kal avacKevacdpevor és Tas vais éoBavtes vauTiKol éyévovTo. KOWn TE aTTwod- \ / ef % A , pevot TOV BapBapov vVaTepoyv ov TOAX@ rex plOn- / / \ cav mpos Te “AOnvatous cai Aaxedaipovious\oi Te 7 amooravtes7Bacthens “EAAnves kal ot Evptrone- paoavTes) Suvdper yap TavTa meyiora Seepavy’ 3 (ayvor yap ol ev KaTa yhv, of 6é vavaiv. Kal Odiyov pwév Ypovov Evvépervev 1) Oparypia, eTvTELTAa dueveyOévtes of Aaxedatpoviot Kai of ‘AOnvaior b / \ a / \ ? , eTONEuNnoay peta TOV EvpLLaywY POs aAAnXoOUS, \ na v ¢ / ” é al Kal Tov ad\A@v EXAnvwv ef Twes Tov dtactatep, , ev lal Tpos TOUTOUS On EXYWpoUY. WaTe-.aTo TaV Mnéu- K@V €S TOVOE Al€el TOY TOAEMOY TA eV OTEVOOMEVOL,

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides at four hundred years or more before 404 B.c., would be about 804 B.c. (Eratosthenes gives 884).

32

BOOK I. xvin. 1-3

period during which the Lacedaemonians have been enjoying the same constitution! covers about four hundred years or a little more down to the end of the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason that they became powerful and regulated the affairs of other states as well. Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lace- daemonians the battle of Marathon? was fought between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten years after that the Barbarian came again with his great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedae- monians, because they were the most powerful, assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians came on, resolved to abandon their city, and pack- ing up their goods embarked on their ships, and so became sailors. By a common effort the Bar- barian was repelled; but not long afterwards the other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from the King and those who had joined the first con- federacy against him, parted company and aligned themselves with either the Athenians or the Lace- daemonians; for these states had shown themselves the most powerful, the one strong by land and the other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, from now on resorted to one or the other. So that from the Persian invasion continually, to this present war, making peace at one time, at another time

2 490 B.O. 33

2

THUCYDIDES

rf a ~ an

Ta S€ ToANEmouYTES GAAHAOLS H TOIS EaUTaD

\

Evupaxyows adpictapévols ev TapecKkevdoavto Ta

\

ToNéula Kal éutrerpoTepoe eyévovTo meTa KLVOUV@D TAS MENETAS TOLOUMEVOL.

, a

XIX. Kal of wév Aaxedatpovior ody vrotenets éyovtes popou Tovs Evpudxous yyobvto, Kat OXL-

al / / yapxiav 5€ dict avtols povoy éemiTndelws OTrws “ee a la) TodiTevoovat OepatrevovTes,, AP@nvatos dé vavs TE lal / A , Ud \ / TOV TOMMY TO YPOvO Taparafovtes, TANV Xiwv / \ / lal al cal AecBiwv, Kal ypipata Tols Tact TakarTes dhépev. Kai éyéveto autos és Tovde Tov TONEMOD ‘ \ % idia TapacKeun pelfwv 7) WS TA KpaTLOTA TOTE rat a / ” peta axpaipvods THs Evppayias HvOnoav.

XX. Ta pév ody Tadata ToradTa nipov, yadeTra wv \ Con / na rd \ édvTa tavtl é&fs Texunplo TioTedoal. ol yap

\ > \ al / avOpwirot TAS AKOaS TOV TPOYEYEVNMEVOV, Kal HV id , / eTrex wpla chicw 7%, ouoilws aBacavictws Tap ’ a fol adAnrov Séyovtat. “AOnvaiwy yovv To TAHOVos ed ” ei? & 7. | , Immapyxov olovtat vp’ “Appodiov kal “Apiotoyet- Tovos TUpavvoy 6vTa aToUavely Kal ovK icacL ef ¢€ / \ 4 x > ge) éte Immias pev mpecButatos wy npyxe Tav Ierou- / cs / \ \ \ > otpatou viéwy,” Immapyos 5€ Kai Oeccanros aber- a / a hol joav avtov, Urototyicavtes O€ TL exelyn TH a € / ,’ nuepa Kal tapaxphua “Apuddtos cal “Apiotoyet- > a / / ¢ / 7 twv ex Tov Evvedotay apiow Imria pweunviocba,

1 of. Vis ixxxy.(2,5 Vo. lyvii.4, 2 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.c. cf. 111. L 3 i.e. as if they took place in some distant land.

34

BOOK I. xvur. 3-xx. 2

fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, these two states prepared themselves well in matters of war, and became more experienced, taking their training amid actual dangers.

XIX. Thé Lacedaemonians maintained their hege- mony without kééping-theirallies tributary to them, but took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, main- tained theirs by taking over in course of time the ships of the allied cities, with the exception of Chios 1 and Lesbos,” and by imposing on them all a tax of money. And so the individual resources of the Athenians pvailable for this war became greater than thosé of themselves and their allies when that alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I have found to have been such as I have described, although it is difficult in such matters to credit any and every piece of testimony. For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same,? even though these events belong to the history of their own country. Take the Athenians, for example ; most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.4 They do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers ; further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspect- ing, on that very day and at the very moment of executing their plan, that information had been con- veyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators,

*514.B.c. On this digression, cf. Hdt. v. lv.; vi. exxiii.; Arist. ’A@. Tod. 17 f. 35

THUCYDIDES

ra A ’ / e / , \ Tov pev aTéayYovTo ws mpoeLdoTos, BovrAopuevor bé a \ i mow EvrrAnPOjvat Spacavrés Te Kal Kwdvvedoa, fal \ tT ‘Immapy@ TepituxXovTes Tapa TO AewxKopeov kadrovpevoy thv Iavabnvaixny toumnv é1ako- 3 opoovte améxteway. Trodda &€ Kal ddXa Ett Kal fal / viv ovTa Kal ov ypovm apvnoTovpeva Kal ob adrot“EAAnvEes ovK OpPas olovTal, W®aTEP TOUS Ld / \ al , te Maxedaipoviwv Bacihéas un mid Whd@ tpoc- tiOec Bat Exatepov, adra Svoiv, Kal Tov Letavatny / > val = a 3533 / , icf Oyo avtois eivat, Os OVS eyéveTo TWTOTE. OUTWS atanraitwpos tois todXots 7 EntTnats THS adn- Geias cal érl Ta éToiwa madXov TpéTTOVTAL. XXI. Ex b€ Tov eipnuévayv Texunpiwv Guws an ” / / a iol > TolavTa av Tis voulfwv padiota & dindOov ody apyaptavot, Kal ovTE @S ToLNnTAal UuvyKact Tept aUuTa@YV éTl TO EelCov KoTMODVTES AANOV TLETEVOY, ” e /, / b] \ \ ovTE ws Aoyoypada EvvéGecayv éml TO Tpocaya- , Cal > / x > / v > , yoTEpov TH akpodcet 7) adnOéaTEpor, dvTa ave&é- AeyxTA Kal TA TOAAG UTO Yporov aUT@Y aTiaTwsS Sack \ \ a > / e a Ar oe / éml TO uwvOM@bes ExverixnKoTa, nupnabas SE Nynod- ral / pevos €k TOY ETLPAVETTAT@Y ONMELWY WS TadaLa 2 elvat aToYpwrvTws. Kal O TOAEMOS OUTOS, KaiTrEp

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo Patrous.

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti- cised. cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; rx. liii., where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme (cf. Hdt. 111. lv.) to a division of the army.

36

BOOK I, xx. 2—xx1. 2

held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do something before they were seized and then take their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was mar- shalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanc- tuary called Leocorium,! and killed him. There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes? as well hold mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that the Lacedaemonians have the “ Pitana company ” in their army, which never at any time existed. So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand.

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, any one would not err who should hold the view that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which the poets have put into song, adorning and amplify- ing their theme, and, on the other, which the chroniclers have composed with a view rather of pleasing the ear® than of telling the truth, since their stories cannot be tested and most of them have from lapse of time won their way into the region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He should regard the facts as having been made out with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest indications, considering that they have to do with early times. And so, even though men are always

3 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting the works of the poets and early logographers before the people.

37

THUCYDIDES

a > , > ? \ A la \ , TOV avOpwray ev @ Mev AV TOAEM@CL TOY TApOYTA DEON / , / \ \ > alel péyloTov KpwovTwV, Tavoapévwy bé Ta ap- al a / > > > lal lal yy yata waddov GCavpalovtwr, amt avTav tov ép-

la] , e a / yov oKxoToval Snrtoce Ouws pelCwv yeyevnuévos auTav. \¢a@ / s XXIT. Kai 60a pév ovo elroy Exactor f pér- ) Pe * A A AovTEs TOAEUNTELY 1 EV AVTO HON OvTES, YadeTrov \ > / > \ A / al THY axpiBerayv avTny TaV AEXPEvTwY Siapynmoved- 2 > 4 b di bene) vw \ a LY / TAL HV E“OL TE WY AUTOS HKOVCA Kal TOls ANXOOEV e > mo0ev éuol atrayyéAXovow* ws © av eddoKavy pot 7 \ ‘a 2 AN , \ / / . ExaoToL Tepl TOY alel TapoYTwY Ta SéovTAa wadiaT ’ la 3 / 7 b] / al E / , ELTELVY, EXOMEVM OTL EyyUTaTA THs EvpTaoNs yvo- A > la) / e/ ” \ ns TOV AANOAS NeYOevTwWY, OUTwWS ElpnTaL Ta Iu a , > lal / > > 5 épya tTav mpaxGevtwy €v TH TOdeUw OVK eK rat / / > } / Tov TapatuxovTos TUVOavopevos nELwoa ypadeuv BOF ae > Lon FO > ’ = Se am an \ ovo ws éuol édoKxer, GAN ols Te avTOS Traphy Kal an oe y Tapa tov addwv\ dcov Suvarov axptBeia rep) / , Exaatou émeceNOwv. emitovws O€ nUpta KETO, S.i0Tt lal 3. \

oi TapovTes TOIs Epyols ExdoToOLs OV TaUTAa Tepl

lal b ] lal »- > ’ e e / > / T@Y avTwY EdEeyoV, GAN WS EXATEPWY TLS EVVOLAS ny / ” Las \ > r ” \ 7) pvnuns Exot. Kal €s pev AKpoacwW lows TO

un pv0@des avT@v ateprrectepoyv paveitar’ daot

38

BOOK I, xxi. 2-xxn. 4

inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge the present one the greatest, but when it is over to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet this war will prove, for men who judge from the actual facts, to have been more important than any that went before.

XXII. As to the Epacchen that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me re- ports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under con- sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occa- sion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible ac- curacy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the en- deavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their cham- pionship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem

39

THUCYDIDES

\ / A , \ \ 5€ BovAjcovtat TOV TE yEevowéevwv TO cages a lal / oKoTrEly Kal TOV peAXOVTMY TrOTE avOLS KATA TO , avOpwrivov ToLovTwY Kal TapaTANnciwy EcecOat, > t , “a vG.| > id Y A / opera Kpivery av’Ta apKxovvtas fer. KTHpa Te €5 alel wadrov 7) aywovicpa. és TO Tapayphpua axovew EvyKeiTat. XXTII. Tav 6€ mpotepov Epywv péyiotov érpa- , x a lal / xOn TO Mndckov, Kal TOVTO Ouws dvoiv vavpaytaw s Lal / Kal TeCowayiaw Tayelayv THY KpLaL Eayev. 7100- a“ iol , tov 5€ ToD Todéu“ov pHKOs TE péya mpovBn, / / / / > > n a TaOnuata te EvynvéxOn yevéoOar év ai’T@ TH ¢€ / a > 4 > ” Ud LA \ EdXabe ola ovy Etepa év iow Xpovw. ovTE yap / /, al . ToAes Tocalde ANdUcioas nonuwoOnoay, ai pev e q / e ’ e \ ~~ ’ a 3 imo BapBapwv, ai S vro chav adtav avtitrone- / 2 pee”. § 3 Pay \ - , , povvtav (eat & ai Kal otxyjtopas petéBadov e / bd \ / > / \ addioKopevat), ovTe Puyal tocaide avOpoTav Kai Ul e \ ’ b) \ % , ¢ \ \ \ hovos, 0 wey KAT AUTOV TOV TrOAELOY, O dé Sta TO , n otaciavey. Ta TE TPOTEPOY akon meV AEyouEVa, , 4 épyo O€ omavwtepov BeBatovpeva ovK amiocta lal / ¢ ral KATEOTN, TELOU@V TE Tépl, Ol ETL TAELTTOY Gua a / pépos ys Kal toxupoTatos ot avtol éméaxor, e~ / ? sf A \ Ee fal HALou Te €xrElers, al TUKVOTEPAL Tapa Ta éK TOD ’ Ul mplv “povov pynuovevopeva EvvéBncar, avypot TE €oTt Tap ols peyddo. Kal am avTav Kal ALpol

1 Artemisium and Salamis. 2? Thermopylae and Plataea. 3 As Colophon (111. xxxiv.), Mycalessus (vil. xxix.)

40

BOOK I. xxi. 4-xxi1. 3

less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way—for these to adjudge my history profit- able will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time.

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times was the _Persian war) and yet thiswas quickly decided in_ two” sea-fights*)and two land-battles.*, But the Peloponnesian War was protractéd™to™a great length, and in the course of it disasters be- fell Hellas the like of which had never occurred in any equal space of time. Never had so many cities been taken and left desolate, some by the Barbarians, and others by Hellenes* themselves warring against one another; while several, after their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants.5 Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed, whether in the course of the war itself or as the result of civil dissensions. And so the stories of former times, handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a very large part of the earth and were likewise of the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which occurred at more frequent intervals than we find recorded of all former times ; great droughts also in some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly—

* e.g. Plataea (111. Ixviii. 3), Thyrea (1Vv. lvii.),

® e.g. Sollium (11. xxx.), Potidaea (1m. Ixx.), Anactorium (tv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. exvi.).

VOL. I. C 41

THUCYDIDES ;

Kal 1) ovx HKicTa Brawaca Kal pépos TL POecipaca 4 AoLuwodNS VOTOS* TAaUTA yap TdvTAa wETA TODSE 4 Tou ToNéuou dua Evverréeto. ipkavto dé avtod "AOnvaior cat [leXotrovynciot AVTaVTEs TAs TpLAa- KOVTOUTELS OTrOVOaS al avTois éyévovto peta Kv- 5 Bolas adwouw. Ot & tte 8 EXvEaV, Tas aiTias mpovypawa mpatov Kal Tas Svapopds, TOD pr tia tnthoat Tote €& TOU TOTOUTOS TOAEMLOS Tots 6”’EXAnoe Katéotyn. THY mev yap adrnOectatny mpobaci, apavertatny Sé hMoy@ Tous ‘APnvaious Hryobpar pmeyddous ytyvouévous Kal poB8ov rapé- xyovtas tois AaKxedatpoviols avayxdcas és TO TO- Neuery? al & és TO havepov Aeyouevas aitiar aid Aoav éxatépav, ap wv AVoaVTES TAS oTrOVdAS €5 TOV TOAEMOV KATETTHA AD. XXIV. ’Esiésapvos éott TOMS ev Sef éare- ovte Tov “lovioy KOoATOV* TpocotKodat S avdTiy 2 Tavrdytiot BapBapot, Idvpixov EOvos. TavTnv an@xicay pev Kepxupaiot, oixiatns 8 éyéveto Marios "EpatoxXeldov, KopivOtos yévos, Trav ad’ ‘Hpaxdéous, cata 81 Tov madaLov vopov ex THs untpoTrovews KaTakdnOeisy Evvexicay o€ Kal Kopiv@iwv tives kal Tod &ddAov Awpixod yévous. 3 mpoedOovtos Sé Tod xpdvou éyévero 7) TOV ‘Ext- Sapviov Svvapis peyadn Kat trodvdvOpeTros. 4 ctacidcavtes Sé é€v AXXAjAOLS ETN TOANA, @S AéyeTal, ATO TOAEuOU TLVOS TOY TpocoLKwY Bap- Bapev épOapnoar kai THs Suvvduews THs Todds 5 éotepnOnoav. Ta Sé TeXEUTALa Tpd TOvdE TOD ToNemou 0 Onmos avTav e&ediwke Tovs SuvaTous, of b¢ émeAOovtes peta Tov BapBapwy édAnfovTo

42

c 3 cs Oe OUI 1G) = ee Sane Wily : i a ae UY

Lint

Wye.

O ene =LOPONNESUS

Stanford Ltd. London

| |

BOOK I. xxi. 3-xx1v. 5

the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and destroyed a considerable part of the people—the noisome pestilence. For all these dis ters fell upon

Sr ee

them simultaneously with this war. | And the war™ / began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke

the thirty years’ truce,! pong ndce between them

after the capture of Euboea.! The reasons why they

broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes. became involved in so great a war. The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the “Athenians to ‘greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and _ forced

them to war. /But the reasons publicly alleged-on—

“either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows.

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Tau- lantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city according to the ancient custom ; but some Corinth- ians and other Dorians joined the Coreyraeans in establishing the colony. As time passed the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous; but civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponne- sian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and they, making common cause with the barbarians and

1 445 B.0.; of. ch. cxv. 1. 43

THUCYDIDES

s , ral / , n 4 / Tous €v TH TokEL KATA TE YyRV Kal KaTa Oddac- cav. ot 6€ ev TH TONE OvTes “Emvddpuriot

) em elon) emreCovTo, TEUTOVOW és TH Kepxupay Tpea Bers ws unTpoTody odaay, Cedopevor pn ohas Teplopav POerpouevous, ahha Tous Te hevyortas Evvadradtar ohict Kat Tov TOV BapBdpev to- hewov Katahtcat. taita oe ixérar cab elopevor és To “Hpatov édéovto. ot 6€ Kepxupaior tn ixe-

7 > > / 3 ee 7 > /

Teiav ovk ed€Eavt0, GAN ampdKxtous atréTeprpav.

XXV. Dvovtes dé of "Emi dpvior ovdeuiay

adiow amo Kepxupas TYL@piay otcav ev aT op

elXovTo GécOat To Tapon, kal méprpavtes és Acrdous Tov Jeov é eT npoToy EL mapacotev Kopw- Giors Thy mohuy os oiKtoTais Kal Tuo play Twa TE/p@avT amt avTav toveicOa. o 8 avrtois aveike Tapadovvar Kal nyepovas TroveicOa. éXOovtes 6€ of "Emiédyuviot és tTHv KopivOov xata TO payTetov mapéoocav TH amouKiay, Tov TE olKia THY dr obeLKvUvTEs opav éx KopivOov 6 ovTa Kal TO XpneTpLov Onrodvtes, €O€0vTO TE pH chas Teptopav POerpopevous, aX’ emapivar. Kopiv@cou 6€ KaTd TE TO oikatov bmebeEavTo my TLL@piay, vopilovtes ovux Hooov éauTov eivat THY aTrouKiay 7 Kepxupatov, dpa 6€ Kai pices TOV Kepxupaiwy, OTL avTov Tapnwehouv OvTES GTOLKOL, ore Y4p ev Tavnyupect Tals Kolvais éLbovTes yépa Ta voyulopeva ote KopivOiw avdpi

1 The xowal xavnyvpers are the four great games, here doubtless referring especially | to the Isthmian Games held at Corinth. The ‘‘ privileges” would be 7 of honour (xpoedplas), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of

44

BOOK I. xxiv. 5—xxv. 4

attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the city both by land and sea. These, when they were being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, begging them not to look on and see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the barbarians. ‘This petition they made, sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcy- raeans denied their supplication, and sent them back unsuccessful.

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to

settle their present difficulty ; so they sent to Delphi |

and asked the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to procure some aid from them. The god answered that they should deliver it up to them and make them leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder was from Corinth and stating the response of the oracle ; and they begged the Corinthians not to look on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, partly on the ground of right, because they con- sidered that the colony belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For neither at their common festival gatherings } would they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, nor would they begin with a representative of

the mother-city, sending of delegates (@ewpof) to Corinthian festivals, etc.

45

433 B.c

THUCYDIDES

U lal e a ¢ e ” MPOKATAPYOMEVOL TOV lepwV, WaTTEp at addat arotkiat, Tepibpovoovtes 6€ avTods Kav KpPNLG-

5) a / a tov duvdper dvtes KaT exeivov TOY Xpovov omota a ¢ a rots ‘EXAjvev TOVELWTAaTOLS Kal TH eS TONELOV TapacKkevn SvvaT@tepol, vauvTtK@ dé Kat Tod / mpovxyew éoTw Ste érraipomevol Kal KaTa THD / a / Dardkawv tmpoevoixnaow ths Kepxvpas kdéos éxov- x a e \ n T@V Ta TEpt TAS Vads' 7 Kal MadAov éEnpTVOVTO / TO vaUTLKOV Kal Hoav ovK advvaToL TpLpELs Yap elkoou Kal ExaTov UTHpxov avTols OTE HNpXoVvTO TONE MELD. / / XXVI. Ildvtwv odv tovtay éykAnpata éxov- N tes of KopivOsor émepmov és tiv ’Emidapvov ” \ ’ / > / / \ / aopmEevol TV w@perlav, OuKNTOPa TE TOV BovxXo- J a wevov iévar KedevovTes Kal "Awmpaxiwtav Kal Aeveadioy Kal éavtd@v hpovpovs. émopevOnaav \ Pee | > / / = > 5é wetn és “AtroAXNwviav KopivOiwv ovoav aros- "i a / \ / clav, dée. Tov Kepxupaiwy pi K@AVw@VTAL UT av’tav Kata Oadaccay Tepatguuevol. Kepxupator

% ?

Sé érrevdt) HoPovto Tovs TE olKYTOpas Kat ppov-

> / / , povs HKovtas és THY 'Enidauvov tTHy Te atrolKLay / / > / \ / KopwOiow Sedoméevnv, exadretatvovy Kat mhev- cavtes evOvs TévTE Kal ElkooL Vaal Kal VoTEpoV U / / étép@ atom Tovs Te Pevyovtas éxéNevoy KAT’ / > / \ érnpecay SéyecOar avtovs (Gov yap es THY a 2 / Képxupay of Trav Eridapviwy duyades tapous Te \ / aA “ , drrodecvuvtTes Kal Euyyéverav, hv Tpoicyopuevor la /

édéovto ohas KaTayew) Tovs Te Ppovpovs ovs ineecelep aie! Atenas MER Nancie oe eM me ake se 1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a citizen who acted for hn. mpoxatapxéuevor, as the Schol.

explains, d:ddvres mpdrepor (sc. } Tots aAAots) Tas KaTapXaGS, 1.€. giving the hair cut from the victim’s forehead to a repre-

46

BOOK I. xxv. 4-xxv1. 3

Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,! as the rest of the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. For at that time they were in point of wealth equal to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation for war even stronger, while in sea-power they some- times boasted that they were greatly superior, just because of the former occupation of the island by the Phaeacians,? whose glory was in their ships. It was for this reason that they kept on developing their navy, and they were in fact powerful; for they had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when the war began.

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidam- nus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and _ Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest they might be prevented by them if they should at- tempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans perceived that the settlers and the garrison had arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been given up to the Corinthians, they were indizuant. So they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epi- damnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and

sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire (Classen).

2 of. 11. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corcyra was the Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odyssey.

47

THUCYDIDES

? / 3 / KopivO.or éreuryav Kai Tovs oixntopas atomép- ‘ lal / mew. ol 6€ Emiddpuvior ovdev avtav UTNKOVCAa), ’ \ / > >’ > \ e 7 aXXa aoTpaTevovow em avTovs of Kepxvpaios \ lal TegoapaKxovTa vavol peTa Tav guyddav ws / xatatovres, kal tovs “lAdupiovs mpocdraPovtes. , * \ , fal 5 mpockabefouevor S€ THY TOodW TpoEitov ’Emt- / \ / Sapviwv te Tov Bovdopevov kai Tous E€vous amra- a / c / , Geis amriévar' et Sé uj, WS TOdEmLOLS yenoecOaL. e > b > / e \ a v > ws & ov« érreiGovto, ot wév Kepxupatos (€ote 5 > \ ‘ / > / \ / ic@ wos TO Ywplov) éTOALOPKOUY THY TOKLY. XXVII. KopivOi01 &, as avtots éx ths “Em- / > ” id Lal Sdpvov 7AOov ayyedot OTL TOAOPKOVITAL, TApeE- , e oxevatovto aotpateiav, Kal Gua atroikiay és TH > / I] / > \ aw \ € , \ Eidapvov cenpvoooy ei TH toy cal opoig Tov BI \ Bovropevov iévar: et 6€ Tis TO TapavTixa peév \ b] / a / \ / a eOérer Evprrreiv, petéxerv b€ BovreTat T Re , ¢ s be x \ eel B yee * aTrotkias, TevTHnKOVTA Spaypas KaTabevta Kopuv- e Gias péverv. Hoav O€ Kal ot wréovTEs ToAXOl Kal of Tapyvpiov KataBdrXrovtes. edenOynaav dé kal tov Meyapéwy vavol odds Evutrpotréuyar — : > » , e 4s / a . \ el dpa KwAVoWTO v7 Kepxupaiwy mretv: ot dé mapeckevatovto avtois oxT@ vaval Evpdeiy, kai Iladf#s KeharrAnvev téccapow. xal ’Em- Savpiov édenOncar, of tapésyov Tévte, Eppiovis Sé uiav Kal TporSnvioe dv0, Aevxddsor O€ S€xa Kal > a > , , \ , v Aputpaxi@tat onto. OnBatous S€ ypyyata HTNn- , > / \ lal ; cav kal Prevacious, Hrelous 5€ vads Te Kevas eer?

48

BOOK I. xxvi. 3-xxvir. 2

invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcy- raeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they intended to restore, and taking along the II- lyrians also. And sitting down before the city they proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians who wished might go away in safety ; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidam- nians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to the city, which is connected with the shore by an isthmus.

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, pre- pared an expedition and proclaimed at the same time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at once, hut wished to have part in the colony, he might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae! and remain at home. The number that sailed was large, as also of those who deposited the money. Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy them with ships, in case an attempt should be made by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and these were preparing to accompany them with eight ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troe- zenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans

* The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d.,

but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic drachma = 93d.

49

\

2

THUCYDIDES

\ - > lal \ / ra kal xpynuata. autav de KopivOiwy vives tape- oxevalovto Tplakovta Kal Tptofyiduoe omAirat. e lal XXVIII. *Esresdy 5€ érvGovto of Kepxvpaio \ / 5 , ? , \ THv tmapacxeunyv, €dOovtes és KopivOov peta \ , Aaxedatpovioy kat Xuwxvaviov mpécBewr, ods , mapéraBov, éxéXevov KopivOtovs tovs év ’Emida- \ > / pv@ ppoupovs TE Kal OlKNTOPAS aTrayELY, WS Ov nr > / > / lal petov avtois ‘Emidauvov. et O€ Te avtiro.obvTat, dixas OcXov Sobva ev IleXoTOvyNow Tapa To- Aeow als av audotepo EvpSa@ow: orotépov & x an 2 \ / — 4 p - av SixacO7n eivat THY aTroLKLay, TOUTOUS KpaTety: a a / nOerov 6€ kal TO ev Aedois pavteiw émitpéwar. U \ > v cal ? \ , \ > \ MOAEMOV O€ OVK ElwWY Toei: eb O€ LH, KAL avTol wayKxacOncec0ar Epacav, éexeitywy Bralopée avay n » eKELY bévov, A A > / 4 , cal dirous tovetcPar ods ov BovdovTat, ETEpous TaV a n / vov dvT@V parrov, @perias Evera. of 8 Kopiv- Oot amrexpivavto avtots, Hv Tas TE VAS Kal TOUS : / > x 3 / > / 7 BapBapous amo ’Emidauvov amayaywor, Bovdev- / >] lal cec0at' mpotepov & ov Karas Exely Tods pev cal \ \ / modtopxetaOar, Eavtovs bé€ SixdlecPar. Kepxv- cal de > / a ee a \ > > / patos S€ avtéXeyor, hv Kat éxetvor Tovs év ’Emida- vo atTayadywol, Tolncev TavTa: étoipor Sé elvar Kal wate ahotépovs pévery KaTa Yopay ba Oe 4 / @ Y x e bt / otrovoas 6€! moincacbat Ews av 7 Sixn yévnrat. 1 Hude deletes 5é, after Poppo.

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, ray viv bvrwy referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Pelopon- nesians, not to the Illyrians (cf ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo suggested,

5°

BOOK I. xxvit. 2—xxvinl. 5

for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

XXVIII. When the Corcyraeans learned of these preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae- monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the gar- rison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the matter for arbitration to any states in the Pelopon- nesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever party the colony should be > adjudged to belong, these should have it; and they were willing also to submit the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, they warned them not to bring on; but if it must be, they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced the issue, to make friends with those for whom they had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order to secure assistance.! The Corinthians answered that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper for them? to be discussing arbitration while the Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces at Epidamnus; but they were also ready to arbitrate on condition that both parties should re- main where they were and that they should make a truce until the decision should be given.®

2 4.e. the envoys and the Corinthians.

3 Or, omitting dé, ‘‘that they were also ready to make a

truce until the decision should be given, on condition that both parties should remain where they were.’ 5!

ie)

THUCYDIDES

\ XXIX. KopivOsor dé oddév tovtTwy wrHKovor, > ’ > \ / > cad S e a \ e GXWN érrevdyn TAYYELS AVTOIS NoaY al VIEs Kal ol Evupayor Tapjoav, TpoTéuavtTes KnpuKa Tpd- Tepov TOAELov TpoepouvTa Kepxupators, apavTes / e éSdounxovta vavol Kal révte SurxtdLo1s TE OTNE- > tals émdeov emt THY "Emidapvoy, Kepxupators évavtia TodeunoovtTes’ eoTpaTHyer O€ TOV pev al e , veav “Aptotevs 0 TleAXiyou kat Kaddxpdtns o r 4 a na KadXiov cai Tindvop o Tiav@ous, tov 6€ mefov ? € id Apyétios te 0 Evputiwou xat ‘Ioapyisas o "Icapxyov. émerdn 8 éyévovto év ’Axtiw Tis a e X ~ 3 / "Avaktopias ys, 0 TO lepov tod *AroAd@VOS A nw? fal éotiv, ml TO GTOmaTL TOD ApmpaktKod Kodzrov, oi Kepxupato. enpuxa Te tpovTeuwav avtois €&v axati@ atepotvTa pn Treiv él odas, Kai Tas la ¢ / vads dua erdnpovv, CevEavtés Te Tas Tadatas \ @ote TAwipous elvat Kal Tas addas eTLOKEYA- ? c a > / cavtes. ws 6€ 6 KHpvE Te aTnyyetkey ovdev nr \ rn 3 , rn A eipnvaiov Tapa Tov KopivOiwv Kat ai vijes avtois / émeTApwvtTo ovaat oydonKovta (TeccapaKxovTa / / yap "Emiéauvov éroXopKxovy), avtTavayayopevot Kal wapatazapevor evavpdxnoav Kai éviknoav of Kepxupaio. mapa Tov Kat vals TEVTE Kat , / lal / An \ > lel Séxa SiébOecpav tev KopivOiwv. 7H O€ auth ec / > la / \ \ \ ID / nuépa autois Evvé8n Kal Tovs THY Eaiéapvor r / e / modLopKovyTas TapacTncacVat omodroyia wate \ \ b] / > / / \ Tovs pev émnyrvdas atroddcBat, Kopiv6vous dé / Y4 oe x by / Sioavras éxew Ews av Addo Tt Oo€n. / r a XXX. Mera 8 rHv vavpayiav ot Kepxupaior tTpotaiov oticavtes emt TH Aeuxiuvyn THs Kep- \ / e Kupalas akpwTnpi@ Tods ev Grdovs ods EXhaBov

52

BOOK I. xxix. 1-xxx. 1

XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships were manned and their allies were at hand, they sent a herald in advance to declare war against the Corcyraeans ; then, setting off with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Ti- manthes; the infantry under that of Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. But when they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, having previously strengthened the old vessels with cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and having put the rest in repair. When “fheir herald brought back no message of peace from the Corin- thians and their ships were now fully manned, being eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidam- nus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing up in line, engaged in battle; and they won a complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. On the same day it happened that their troops which were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition that the other immigrants! should be sold into slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until something else should be agreed upon.

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory in the territory of Corecyra, and put to death the

1 4.¢e. the Ambraciots and Leucadians ; ¢f. ch. xxvi. 1.

434 B.o

THUCYDIDES

, / aixyuarwrtous améxtewav, Kopuvbious 6 dyoavtes “ ? ef / nf \ e / \ e elyov. tatepov dé, érretdn ot KopivOsor cat ot Evupayor joonpévot Tals vavoiv aveywpnoav én’ oixov, THS Oadadoons amdons éxpatovy THs KAT a \ / a éxetva Ta ywplia,ot Kepxupaior, cal wrevoavtes 3 s Neate / ? , a na és Aeuxdda thv KopivOi@v atrotkiay ths yhs éte- \ / Ny 2 / ? 7, ey! pov Kal KudAAnvny to 'HAelwv ériverov evérrpnoar, nr / fal OTL vals Kal ypnwata Tapécyov KopivOiois. Tod \ a \ TE Ypovouv TOY TAEloTOV META THY VaUvLAYLaV émekpatouv ths Oadaoons Kal tovs tov Kopu- Oiwy Evppayous éemimréovtes EfOerpov,)wéeypt ov / 4 a / / lal Kopiv@to. treptovtTe T@ Oéper TréeurpavTes vavs Kal lal € 4 / oTpatiay, evel ofav ot EVupaxor Errovovp, €oTpa- > \ / toTredevovto émi ‘Axtiw Kal mepl TO Xetpuépiov a / a 4 a / THs Oeot partidos, Pvrakis &vexa THs te Aevxados A / , / Kal TOV AAAwY TOAEWY Goat odict hirttat Hoav. / A avtectpatoTedevovto O€ Kal of Kepxupaio: ért A / A / tH Aevkiuyvn vavot te nal melO. érrétdedv TE \ \ fa) ovdéTEPOL GAANAOLS, GAA TO Oépos ToUTO avTt- , a > / > KabeCouevor Yetw@vos On avexw@pnoav én’ olkou EXATEPOL. \ \ XXXI. Tov 5€ éviavtov wavta Tov peta THY vavpaxiav Kal Tov vtoTtepov of KopivOror opyn \ hépovtes Tov pos Kepxupaious oXemov évavTrn- youvTo Kal TapecxevaloyTo Ta KpaTioTa veov atodov, &k Te avTHs IleXoTovvyncou ayeipovtes A © , a Kal THs GAAS “EAAdSos Eepétas picO@ reiPovTes. muvOavomevot 5€ of Kepxupaio: tiv tapacKevny a a 7 \ avtav époS8odrTo, Kai (Haav yap ovdevos ‘EXAN-

54

BOOK I. xxx. 1—xxx1. 2

prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But after- wards, when the Corinthians and their allies had gone back home with their ships after their defeat, the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea\in that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they had control over the sea; and sailing against the allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing to an end,! seeing that their allies were suffering, sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thes- protis, as a protection for Leucas and the other cities that were friendly to themselves. And the Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leu- cimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side sailed against the other, but they faced each other for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter had come that they each went back home.

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily in- dignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept building ships and preparing a naval armament with all their might, and collected oarsmen from both the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the in- ducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, were alarmed when they learned of their pre- parations, and since they were without an ally among

1 wepidyrt (as the MSS. read) = repudyr:. But Ullrich (Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = év tG wepidvts tod Gépous, ‘‘in what remained of the summer.” So Boehme.

55

THUCYDIDES

” > as. 9 / e \ ” > vov Evotrovoot ovde EveypaavTo EAUTOUS OUTE ES \ ’ / \ ” > \ S ras ’A@nvaiwy otovdas ovTe és tas Aaxedat- poviwv) eo£ev avtois éMOodaw ws Tors “AOnvai- ous Evpudyous yevécfar kal @pediav Twa TeLpa-

> ’ > lal e / e \ /

cOar am’ avTov evpioxea Oat. ot 6€ KopivOcor muOopevot TAUTA mrOov Kal auto. és Tas A@nvas mpeaBevoopevor, OT WS Hn opict mpos T@ Kep- KUPalwY VAUTLK@ Kal TO aUTaV T poo ryevopevov €uTr0OLov yevntas GécOar Tov TONE HOV 4 ©Bov- NovTal. KaTaoTdons 66 éxKANGlas és avTiAoylav

ArAOov. Kal of wev Kepxvpaios édeEav tordde. XXXII. “Alxatov, ® ’AOnvaiot, Tovs pyre evepyetias peyadns unte Evppayias mpovderro- Levys hKovtas Tapa Tovs TéXas émLKOUpLas, wo- wep Kal jwels viv, Senoopévovs avadioagar Tpa- / Seat \ , / > O\ Tov, wadiaTa mev ws Kal Evudopa Séovtas, et dé un, Te ye ove emitnpia, erecta S€ ws Kal THY / f ¢ ? \ 4 \ \ yapw BéBaov EEovow: ei dé TovTwY pndev cages KataoTooUet, pn opyifec Oar hv aTUX@ow. Kep- Kupator dé pera TNS fuppaxias THS aitnoews Kal TavTAa TLOTEVOVTES exupa bmiv mapeter Oat amré- OTELAAY 1)LGS. TETUNNKE d€ TO avTO emeribevpa

5 epat

mpos Te Upas és THY Xpetay ayer aroyov Kal és Ta HyéeTepa avTov ev TO Tapovre a€vppopov.

Evppaxot Te yap obdevés TW €V T@ TPO TOV x°%

EXOUCLOL ‘YEvopevor viv addXwv TovTO Senoopevor Koper Kal dua és TOY TapovTa Trodeu“ov Kopu- Oiwv phot é0 avTo caléaTapen. Kal TEpte- otnKev Soxodca Hua mpoTEepoy cwhpocvvn, TO

56

¢

BOOK I. xxx1. 2—-xxxit. 4

the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lace- daemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their allies, and try to procure some aid from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent the addéssion of the Athenian fleet to that of the

Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling

the war as they wished. And when an assembly was held opposing speeches were made, and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

XXXII. “It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that those who, without any previous claim on the score of important service rendered or of an existing al- liance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we do now, should show in the first place, if possible, that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their gratitude can be depended on; but in case they establish neither of these things ‘clearly, they should not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full con- fidence that they will be able to give you guarantees on just these points. But it so happens that our policy has been at one and the same time incon- sistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, and is also disadvantageous under present circum- stances to ourselves; for although heretofore we have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the same time, in the face of the present war with the Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no

57

a 438n,.0

THUCYDIDES

\ DJ AX / / a a a. , fn €v adXotpia Evppaxyia TH TOV Tédas youn 7 a“ > Zz \ > / Evyxiduvevew, viv aBovria cat acbévera hai-

\ vouern. THY “ev OY yEevouernv vavpaxiay avTol \ / > / / > \ \ KaTa povas atewoduela KopivOiovs: émerdy bé pelCove. tapackevn amo IleXorovvncov Kal Tis € ’ a ral Gdns “EAXddos éf’ Huds wpunvrat cal jpeis b] ‘Af e la! ” a > / / / GOvVaTOL Op@pev dvTES TH OiKEela povoy Suvdpet ~~ / \ we / e , eB / mepliyevec Oar, Kal Gua péyas 0 Kivodvvos, €i éoo- : ae ? a 1° % eon ee peOa um’ avtois, avayxn Kal tuav Kal adXov a \ mavtos émixoupias SetcPat, cal Evyyvopun, m1 \ / , \ 6 rng (ae ma ’ peta Kaxias, do—ns 6€ wadXov apapTia TH Tpo- / lal TEPOV ATPAYLOTUYH evavTia TOALMpED. XXXII. “Vevycerac Sé tyiv recOopévors \ e / \ \ ol e / Katyn 7 EvytTvylia KaTa Toda THS NweTéepas xpelas, Tp@Tov pev Ste adixovpévois Kal ovy étépous BAamTovet THY émixovpiav TroinoedOe, évelTa TEpL TOV peyloTwy KWwduvevovtas beEa- fevol ws Gv padioTa eT alelvynoToU papTupiouv / Tv xapiv KkatabnoecOe, vauvTixoy Te KEexTHwEOa \ fal ’ e nw “~ 4 / TAnY Tov Tap vuly TrELoTOV. Kal oxevadbe / a / tis evmpakia oTaviwtépa Tis Tots ToNEpiols . a \ lal AUTNpOTEpA, EL HV UuEels AV TPO TOAA@Y Ypnpa- Twv Kal yapiTos éTiunoadGe Suvamiy vpiv Tpoo- v yevécOar, attn Tadpectiv avTeTayyEeATOS, avev Kiwdvvev Kal datravns didovca éavtny Kal mpoc- , , 5) \ \ \. gf 9 , 2 82 eT. hepovoa €5 pey TOUS TrOAAOUS apETNHY, Ols O€ a a lal > a évrapuveite yap, tyiv 8 avtois ioxvv: & ev TO

58

BOOK I. xxx. 4—xxxill. 2

foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to take our share of the danger of our neighbour's policy—has now, in the event, proved want of wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Co- rinthians single-handed ; but now that they have set out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see that we are unable to prevail with our own strength alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if we come into their power, we are constrained to ask help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardon- able if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon a course that runs counter to our former policy of avoiding foreign entanglements.

XXXIII. “ For yourselves, if you concede what we ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged and not to those who injure others; next, by taking into alliance men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for grati- tude with a record which will abide in our memories for ever; and, lastly, we havea navy greater than any but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than this—that the power which you would have ac- counted it worth much money and gratitude to acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itselt to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, besides, a good name before the world, gratitude from those wlio are to receive your help, and en- hanced strength for yourselves? To few in all

59

THUCYDIDES

Tavtt ypovw ortyors 67 awa mayTa EvvéBn, Kal OALyoL Evppaxias Seopevor ols emKarOvVTAL ao paretav Kat Koo Lov ovx ‘acov dLoovTes 7 Ane opevor TapayiyvovTar.

3 “Tov € TOAEMOY, dv 6vTrep NENT WOU av elev, el TUS UEOY fy) OleTaL éeveo Oar, yvOLuNsS dpaptaver Kal ovK aia Paverat TOUS Aaxedatpovious poBw TO UpeTépo TONE UN TELOVTAS KaL Tous Kopw- Oious, CURE MELOUS Tap avtois Kal vuiv exOpous ovTas," TpokaTadauPavovras meas vov é€> THY UmeTepav em iXelpnow, iva 1) T@ Kow@ é&xOer KaT avTovs eT adn ov oT Lev pnee évoiv pbdcat auapTwciy, } Kak@oa Huas 7) chads av-

4 tous BeBaiwcacba. nuétepov 5é y av épyov TpoTEpHcat, TOV jev didovtav, Uuav 6é deFape- vov TV Evppaxiar, Kal TpoeTeBovrEvelw avTots MaAXov 7) avtTemuBoureverv.

XXXIV. «Hp dé Neyoouy @s$ ov dixaLtov Tous apeTepous aTroiKous: vpas déxeo bat, pabovrav @S Taga aTrolKia ev pev TaaxXovea TULG THY pnt porrorsy, adixoupevy dé @XoTptovrar ov yap errl TO dodXot, aX €ml T@® Omotoe Tois NerTropeE-

2 vots Elva EKTEMTOVT AL, @S oe NOLKOUD cahées cot” T poxrnbevres 1p. mept *Emiddpvou és Kplolv TONEM@ AadXAOV h TO low EVovd nOncav Ta

3 éyxAnuata peTeNOetv. Kal Upiv Eotw TL TEKLN-

1 kat, before mpoxataAauBdvovras in the MSS., deleted by Stahl.

1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians, ch. xli. 1

2 Or, retaining «af before mpoxataAauBdvortas, ‘‘and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you,

60

BOOK I. xxximn. 2-xxxIv. 3

history have such opportunities fallen all at the same time, and few are they who, when they beg for an alliance, come offering to those to whom they make their appeal as large a degree of security and honour as they expect to receive.

“ Now as to the war which would give us occasion to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great influence with them and are enemies of yours,} are making a beginning with us now? with a view to a subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may not be led by our common hatred to take our stand together against them, and that they may not fail, before we unite, to attain their two objects—to harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our business, on the other hand, to get the start of them—we offering and your accepting the alliance —and to forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them.

XXXIV. “ But if they say that it is not right for you to receive their colonists, let them know that while every colony honours the mother-city so long as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes alienated ; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. And that they were in the wrong is manifest ; for when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus they preferred to prosecute their charges by war rather than by equity. And let their present treat- are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great in-

fluence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon

WOE, <as. 61

bo

THUCYDIDES

a r lal 4 plov & tpos nuas tors Evyyeveis Sp@ow, Bote aTaTn TE Ln TapayecOat UT avTav Seopévoss TE

a“ € al c , \ €x Tov EvOéos ut) UTroUpyelv: Oo yap éAayloTas TAS peTaperelas €x Tod yapifecPat Tois évayTioss LauBavav acdaréatatos av d:aTeXoin.

XXXV. “Avoete 5€ obdé Tas Aakedatpoviwr omovoas Seyomevot nuas undetépwy dvtas Evypa- \ r a ¢ yous. elpntat yap év avtais, tav “EdAnvidav A an lal > TOkewv Aris pndapod Evumayel, éEeivar wap oToTépous ay apécxntar deity. Kai Sewwov e Totade pev ATO TE TOY évoeTrOvowY ecTaL TANPOUY \ a \ s Anis a ¥ ©) / TAS VavS Kal TPOTETL Kal EK THS AAANS ‘EAXA6os KQL OVX HKLTTA ATO TOV UpETEepoV UINKOwWY, HUaS dé amo THs TpoKeméervns Te Evupayias eipEovar \ > \ fol »” / Q ’ / s 1 > Kal ato THS addOVEV Tofev @perias, eita! ev adixnuate Oncovtat TweccbévtTwv vuav & deopea:

\ \ > , bey 4 e a \ / ~

ToAv O€ €v TrELoVL aiTia Tueis TeicavTeEs cal a \ 4 vuas EEomev’ Huds wev yap Kwduvevovtas Kal ovK €yOpovs dvtas ata@cecbe, tTavde Sé ovY STAs Ko@\uUTAal éxOpa@v dvTwYv Kal étiovT@Y yevnoedbe, adda Kal ao THS UpeTépas apyns SvvapLy mpoc- lal ’

AaBetv meprovrecbe: jv ov Sixaiov, GAN 4 KaxKel- vov KwAVELY TOUS Ex THS tweTépas picbodopous 7 \ e a / , a a ’ / kat nuiv TeurTre KAO O TL av TEcOnTE @periav

/ \ > \ al fa) / ddtota O€ ato Tod mpodavods deEapévous Bon- Geiv. modda Sé, WoTrep ev apxR UTreiTOpEV, TA Evudépovta amodetxvupev, Kal péytotov Ott of TE

2 With the MSS.; Kriiger conjectures ef re, followed by Hude.

62

BOOK I. xxxiv. 3-xxxv. 5

ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret doing favours to his opponents will ever remain most secure.

XXXV. “ Neither will you be breaking your treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipu- lated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be al- lowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us from the alliance that should naturally be open to us as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to con- cede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at fault if we fail to win your consent; for you will be repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, while as regards these men, who are enemies and ag- gressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces from your own dominions. To that they have no right; but it is right that you should either prevent them from raising mercenaries in places under your control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever terms you may be induced to make; but it would be best of all for you openly to receive and help us. And many, as we suggested at the outset,! are the advantages which we can show you, and the most important of all is this, that the enemies of both of

1 Ch. xxxiii. 1,

63

THUCYDIDES

tte | / e a 2 4 4, avTol rodéutor nuiy joav (dTep capeoctaTy , \ 2x > > a > OR 4 \ mTiaTls) Kal ovTOL oOvK aabeEvEis, AAX iKaVOL TOUS

/ / \ na \ > petactavtas Prawar. Kal vavTiKhs Kal ovK fa! 4 / e hmetpwtioos THS Evppaytas didowevns ovy opoia \ / 4 adXoTpiwais, GAA padLoTAa péev, Eb duvacbe, rn r 4 > pndéva addov éay KextHaVar vais, & O€ pm, A / 54 Satis éyupwtatos, TovToV dirov ExeL. XXXVI. “Kal étw tade Evpdhépovta pév Soret ral \ \ > \ , Aévyer Oa, hoBetras 5é wy de’ avta TeLOopevos Tas \ / , \ \ \ > os \ orovdas AVE, yUOTW TO pev dEedL0s aUTOD iaydY a nr \ x éyov Tovs évavtious wadrov hoBijaov, To dé Oap- ra / \ a \ > s, cobv pi deEapévov acbeves Ov pos toxXvVOVTAas f / tors €xOpovs abdeéctepov eaopevov, Kal awa ov A a / fa) \ / a \ lal > mept THs Kepxtpas viv To wAéov 7 Kal Tov ’AOn- la / An vav Bovrevdpevos, Kal ov Ta KpaTLcTa avTais lal ev ‘\ / mpovo@y, oTav €> Tov péANOVTA Kai Goov ov / \ , a TapovTa TOAE“OY TO aUTIKa TEeploKOTT@V €v- / “ 4é Sordtn xwpiov mpocdaSeiy 6 peta peyloTtwr ad lal / a fol Kalp@v olKELoUTaL TE Kal ToAEp“OUTAaL. THs Te , /, a yap “Itadias Kal ixedlas Kadk@s Tapdmdov a la \ lal KelTal, wate ponte éxellev vauTixov eacat IleXo- movynotos émedOeivy To Te évTedDOEv pos TaKet , / TmapaTéurpat, Kal és TaXXA Evphopwtatov éotwy.

1 So jcay seems to mean here, where eiof was to be ex- pected ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3.

2 Sef or Eupdéper seems to be implied.

3 The thirty-years’ truce with Sparta; ¢/. ch. xxiii. 4,

64

BOOK I. xxxv. 5—xxxvi. 2

us are, as we see,! the same—which is the surest guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but able to injure those who withdraw from them. And furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with a maritime and not with a continental power, the alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indif- ference ; on the contrary, you should? by all means, if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but if that is impossible, you should have as your friend him who is strongest therein.

XXXVI. “If anyone thinks that this course is in- deed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this con- sideration he will be breaking off the truce,’ he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid ;* whereas, if he re- ject our alliance, his confidence ® will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong. He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the in- terests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious con- sideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences. For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting voyage either to Italy or Sicily,® so that you could prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Pelo- ponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; and in other respects it is a most advantageous

‘ te. of themselves breaking the truce.

5 i.e. in the security of the truce.

6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than sail through the open zea.

65

THUCYDIDES

x, A / = 3 Bpaxyvtato & av xeparaio, tots te Evurrace kal > ee a >A \ / € a / Kal’ Exactov, TOD av pn TpoécOar Huas walouTe / ‘ v / ” lal vf , Tpla pev Ovta Aoyou afva Tots EXAnoe vautixa, \ » Bea al \ \ = / \ \ , TO Tap viv Kai TO 7meTepov Kat TO KopwOtov: / \ 7 al TovTwy dé et meptowerbe Ta dvo és TavTOV EOeiv a / kat KopivO:o. juas tmpoxatadnovtat, Kepxv- / \ / paiows te Kal IleXorrovynctous apa vavpaynoerte / pt Bina by 4 \ > \ , deEauevor 6€ nuas e€eTEe TpOs avTOUs TAéELoCL a / / E vavol tals nwetépats aywviferbas.” an a s 4 Towadta pev of Keprvpaios eirov: ot 6€ Kopiv- >] Oot eT avTovs Tordoe. XXXVII. “’Avayxaiov Kepxupaiwv tavde od / a a bé Q a \ / povov Tept Tod béEacOa ohas Tov oyov TroLnoa- , ’ x ¢ 4.) se a a a \ oy \ HEVOV, ANN WS KAL NMELS TE AOLKOUVMEV KAL AUTOL > / lal ral OUK ELKOTWS TONELODYTAL, LYnoOévTas TpaToV Kal € a \ > / e \ b \ \ ” Nas TEPL GupoTEepwY OUTW KaL ETL TOV AXXoV / v I ~ \ > ay ie an > / b] oyov lévat, iva THY ad tuav Te akiwow acda- a \ a Né€oTEpov TpoElonTe KaL THY TwVdE yYpElay pH aroyloTws atone. , % ral 2 “acai dé Evppayiav bia TO cHdpov ovdevds \ A mw déFacbar: TO Oo éml Kakoupyia Kal ovK apeTH > / 4 / > / / = éreTnoevoay, Evppaxyov te ovdéva PovrAcpevor / Tpos TadiKnuaTa oUTE! wapTUpa ExELY OvdE Trapa- 3 KadouVTEs aicytvedOal, Kai 7) TONS aUTO@Y aya avtapkn Oéow Keimévn Tapéxer avTovs SixacTas / ca) a @v Brartovci tia padrdrgov Kata EvvOnKas 1 For ov5¢ of the MSS., Dobree’s conjecture. Hude reads ovde. .. ovde.

66

BOOK I. xxxvi. 3—xxxvir. 3

place. And by one briefest concluding word, which embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, you will be convinced that you should not abandon us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us first and you thus let two of these fleets become united, you will have to fight on the sea against both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but if you accept us, you will be able to contend against them with your navy augmented by our own.

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the _

Corinthians as follows: ae

XXXVII. “Since these Corcyraeans have not con- fined themselves to the question of their admission into your alliance, but have gone further and urged that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both these points before we proceed to our general argu- ment, in order that you may be more definitely forewarned of the nature of the demand we have to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting their petition.

“They say that ‘a wise discretion’ has hitherto kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone; but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and because they wished in their misdeeds not to have any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and in- dependent position of this state causes them to be arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree-

67

i

a a

THUCYDIDES

, \ \ = > \ \ / > / ryiyver Oat, dua TO HKLoTa él Todvs TéXAS ExT E- \ , 3 1 ovTas “adtoTa TOUS addOUS aVayKNn KATALpovTas) — , uv \ lal \ = \ BA > déyecOal.; Kai TOTO TO EvTpEeTés AoTTOVSOY Ov SNARE eanase Cae = © nA > iva pn Evvadix@ow ETEpols TpoRBEBAnvTAaL, GAN 7 \ r ? A \ ¢ Nan sp. betta OTWS KATA povas AOLK@oL Kal OTws \év © ev av KpaTaot Bialwvrat,\ob 8 adv AaPaat Tréov Eyo- ow, Hv “8é mod Te TporadBwow avaicyvvT@ciy’ KalTOL El Hoav avopes, BaTEP haciv, ayabol, bow > / = lal / / \ aXnTTOTEpOL Hoav Tos Tédas, TOTW Se havepw- / IEA bd a \ 3 \ nr \ Z Tépay €€hv autos THv apeTny OLdovat Kal Sexo- 4 pévols TA Sixata Serxvuvat. XXXVIII. “’AXN’ ovTE rpds Tols GXOUS OvUTE 3 e al / > / Vv Lan 4 ’ a , és mas Tololde elolv, Atouor © dvTEs abectact \ \ \ a a / e Te OLA TAVTOS Kal VOY TroAELOvGL, NEVOVTES WS ovK éTl TO KAKOS Ee? ise cxmeupietey. 7 [LElS dé ovd’ avtot dapyev emi to (brO Tauren) WBpite- aoOat KatToixioal, arr él TO Hyewoves TE elvas , e cal kal ta elkota OavyatecOar. ai yoov addrXat ATOLKLAL TLL@TLY Nas KAL waNLOTA UTO aTroiKwY , \ A o ’ a , > + atepyouela: Kal Sjrov 6t1, et Tols TA€OTW apé- rf >] , ’ lal oKOVTES EgpEV, TOiTS dv povols OvK OpOas aTrapé- TKOLMEV, OVO ETLOTPATEVOMEV EXTIPETTAS fH Kal 7 SiahepovTws Te adiKovpevot. Kadov & Hv, & Kal / nr st ‘ol a Hwaptavouer, Toiade mev elEar TH HpeTépa opyn, rn \ \ nuiv S€ aiaxpov Bidcoacbar tHv TovTwY peTpE- 68

BOOK I. xxxvil. 3—XXXxvIII. 5

ment; owing to the fact that they resort very little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a very large extent receive into their ports others who are compelled to put in there. And mean- while they have used as a cloak their specious policy of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do wrong all alone; that wherever they have power they may use violence, and wherever they can escape detection they may overreach someone; and if, per- chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by offering and accepting proposals of arbitration. XXXVIII. “ But neither toward others nor to- ward us have they shown themselves honest men ; on the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and to receive from them all due reverence. The rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and by our colonists we are beloved more than is any other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone; nor are we making war upon them in a way so unusual without being also signally wronged. And even if we were at fault, the honourable course for them would have been to make allowance for our temper, in which case it would have been shameful

69

THUCYDIDES

6 étTnTa: BBpe S€ Kal eEovcia wrovTOV TONKA és c al »” e / \ eo (6 e / Has dra Te HuapTHKact Kal Entdapvov nperte-

/ \ al pav ovcav KaKovpéevnvy pev ov TpoceETroLoUVTO, €rOovtwv b€ Huav emt Ttiyuwpia érovtes Bia : hy peo pig ; éyouow.

/ XXXIX. “Kal daci 67) dixn mpotepov €Ge- a F. /

Ajoas KpiverOat, hv ye ov TOV TMpovYoVTA Kai EK lal 5 la) / n Tov aoharovs mpoKxadovpevov Eyer TL Soxeiv ra > % \ ’ y / Bd e A \ \ def, AAG TOV €5 icov Ta TE EPYa OMOLWS KAL TOUS / \ , / Ag

2 royous mpl SsayoviterOar Kafiotavta. ovToL

x > \ a \ / > : A : e / d€ ov Tpliv TONLOpKELY TO KWPLOV, AX érretdn y- lal / / cavto Huas ov Tepiower Oat, TOTE Kal TO EVTIPETTES ol / \ n ths Sixns mapécxovto: Kat Sevpo ‘Kova, ov a /, \ a TAKEL [LOVOY aUTOL GuapToVTEs, GAAA Kal vpas a > rn b a b] \ a \ vov akvodvres ov Evppayeiv, adrAa Evvadixety Kai / v id va) / rn a ~ 3 dsadopous dvtas npiv déyecPar ohas: ovs xXpHy, / / / Ste aohadéoctato. Hoav, TOTE Tpocteval, Kal py év & tpuets pwev HorknucOa, ovTOL Oé KLWdUVYEVOUGL B Tels perv Hdcxijueba, ? ¢€ a n b] a , und ev @ vpeis THs Te Svvduews a’T@Y TOTE OU , al >’ / lal / \ pevaraBovtes THs whedias vdv peTadwoeTe Kal rn 5 a —" r lal TOV GuapTnudtwyv amo Yyevouevor THS ad Huav aitias To lcov é€eTe, Tadat 5é KOWwoaVYTAS THY Sivamwy Kowa Kal Ta aTOBaivovta eye. ae < \ > eae \ , XL. ‘6 Os pev ovv autol Te peTa TpocnKoVYTwY ’ / >’ f \ ~/ / \ eyxAnmatov épyowela kal olde Biarot Kat Teo- 1 eyeAnudtav 5& pdvwv auetdxous ol Tws Tay weTa Tas mpdtets rovTwy wh Kowwveiv, ‘* As, however, you have had no share in the accusations, you should not share in the consequences.”

This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all recent editors except Bloomfield.

7°

BOOK I. xxxvitl. 5-xt. 1

for us to outrage their moderation; but in the insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged us in many other ways, and particularly in the case of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim to when it was in distress, but seized by force the moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold.

XXXIX. “They pretend, forsooth, that they were the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue; but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but rather those of the one who has made his actions tally with his professions before appealing to arms. These men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the place, but only after they had concluded that we would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the blunders they have committed themselves at Epi- damnus, they have come here demanding that you too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive them, now that they are at variance with us. But they ought to have come to you when they were in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are victims of their injustice and they are consequently in danger, nor when you, without having had the benefit of their power before, will now have to give them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing to do with their at ea will have to bear an equal part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you from the first had shared their power ought you to share the consequences also now of their acts.

XL. “ Now it has been clearly shown that we have come with proper grounds of complaint against

71

THUCYDIDES

\ / véxtat eiot Sednrwtat: ws b€ ovK dv Sixatas ’ \ / a / ’ \ v >’ avtous déyocbe pabety yp. ef yap elpntac év Tais otrovoais, e€etvar Tap’ omotépous tis Bov- na / a n AETal TOV aypadwy TorEewy edOEiv, Ov ToIs émh BraBn étépwv lodow 7 EvvOnkn éotiv, adn a \ yy e X\ > fal ’ , ooTls fn aXXoU EaUTOY aTrodTEepwYv aadandelias ra oe \ an / Settat Kal dotis pn Tois SeEapevois, eb swdpo- lal ’ ’ / , a a vovol, ToAELOV avT elpivNns ToLnceEl 0 viv bpels pn TweOopmevor Huiv waPorte av. ov yap Tolade 4 > / 5 aN 4 bd \ \ Chie 3 \ fLovov €TLKoUpoL av yevotcOe, aNrAA Kal Huty avTl €voTovOwY ToNeulol. avayKn yap, eb ite peT la \ BA lal avuT@V, Kal auvvecOat un avev UL@V TOUTOUS. Kal- s ee HR. \ s \ > \ a ToL Oikalol y €oTe paddtoTAa meV exTTOd@Y aTHvaL > / ’ \ / > / 3 \ / ’ audotépols, eb d€ uy, TOUvavTiov él TovTOUS ped e a 7 , / 4 npav tévart (KopivOios pév ye evotrovdoi éote, \ > a , > Kepxupaiows 6€ ovb€ bs avoxwyis teToTE éyé- \ , XN ae o \ vecOe), Kal TOV vopov un KabioTavat Wate TOUS el ye > / / > \ \ e “ étépwv adbiatapévous Séyer@ar. ovd€ yap nyeis / > / a / ? Lauiov aroctavtwy Widov mpocebéueba évav- a a / tiav upiv, Tov addXwv IleXoTrovynciov diya én- 4 lal lal A piopévav €b Ypn avTois apvvew, ghavepas 8é \ , aVTETOMEV TOUS TpoTnKoVTas Evupupayous avTov > \ \ al Tiva KoNaberv. €b yap TOUS KaKov TL SpavTas SeYyouevol TluwpHcete, haveltar Kal a TOV bpere-

1 7.e. ““who will permit peace to be maintained by their new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion.” No new allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion

72

BOOK I. xu. 1-6

them and that they are violent and overreaching ; but you have still to learn that you have no right to receive them into your alliance. For even though it is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is not intended for those who apply to one side for admission with a view to the injury of the other,

but for any one who, without defrauding another

state of his services, asks for protection, and any

one who to those who received him will not—if_

they are prudent—bring. war~instead of peace.} But this is precisely what will be your fate if you do not listen to us. For you will not merely be- come allies to them, but also enemies to us instead of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary for us, if you go with them, to include you when we proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the right course for you would be, preferably, to stand aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against them, remembering that you are under treaty with the Corinthians, but have never had with the Corcyraeans even anarrangement.-to- refrain from hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the precedent of admitting into your alliance those who revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians 2 revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, we on our part did not vote against you; on the contrary, we openly maintained that each one should discipline his own allies without interference. If you receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure to do. 2 440 B.c. cf. ch. cxv.

VOL... D 13

——_ }

|

THUCYDIDES

; / con , \ \ , >4? Pv OUK EAdaow ruiv TpocELcl, Kal TOV Vopov ep ¢ ca > al lal Al *.S ew 2 lal / Upty avtols warrov 7 eh Hutv Oncoere. / \ \ al XLI. “ Atvcar@pata pev ovv tTdde Tpos bpas 4 e \ \ \ ¢ / / / Eyopuev, ‘Kava KaTa TouS EAXjVwY vo“ous, Tapal- , veow 6€ kai akiwow YapiTos ToLdvde, Hv ovK 4 / ? d €yOpol dvtes Wate BXaTTEL ovd avd didor WaT’ > 6 3 an e Lal > An / émixphoGar, avtTidoOjvar muiv év T® Tapovte na lal \ lal , dayev Yphvar. vedv yap paxpav onavicavtés \ \ > lal ¢e \ \ & \ » mote mpos tov Aliy.ntav vu7ep ta Mnédixa \ / fal , movenov tapa Kopiwéiwy eixoot vads édaPete: / ef \ / Kal 7 evepyecia avTn TE Kab 1) és Laptovs, TO ’ ¢e al / > “ y a 62’ nas IeXotrovynatovs avtois pn BonOjcat, a al \ f mapecxev vuiv Aiywntov pev éetiKpatnow, La- piwy 5€ KoAacLY, Kal Ev KAaLpOts TOLOVTOLS EyEVETO, 2 , ” aidsst> 25 \ \ D ois partota avOpwrro. em éxOpovs Tovs oderté- ~ / / pous lovTes TOV ATaYTwWY aTrEpLOTTTOL EloL Tapa a J lal \ nr TO viKav' hirov Te yap NYyoUVTAaL TOV UTOUpyourTa, \ ? / \ hv Kal mpotepov €xOpos 7, TOAEmLOV TE TOV avTt- / a % 4 / ” > \ \ \ > lal OTaYTA, WY Kal TUYN PlrAOS WY, ETEL KAL TA_OLKELA A / a en Dh yetpov TiWevtar dirovixias Eveka THs AUTLKA. -. \ , , XLII. “*Ov évOupnevtes Kai vewtepos tis \ / > ‘ \ > 4 lal Tapa mpecBuTépov avuta pabwyv aktovtw Tots a n / \ \ / , dpotors Huas apvverOar, Kal pH vouton OiKata / / > / pev Tade rEéyecOat, Evudopa Sé, e6 Toreunoe., / \ / b] ? A ddXra elvat. TO Te yap Evyuhepov ev w av TIS

1 Sxtp 7a Mydixd Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude.

74

BOOK I. xu. 6—xin. 2

full as many of your allies will come over to us, and the precedent you establish will be against yourselves rather than against us.

XLI. “ These, then, are the considerations of right which we urge upon you—and they are adequate ac- cording to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a claim based upon it; and since we are not your enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your friends so that we could make use of you, we think this favour should be repaid us at the present time. It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty from the Corinthians. And this service and that we rendered in connection with the Samians—our pre- venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them— enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too, at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing their enemies, are most indifferent to every con- sideration except victory, regarding any one who assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be- fore, and any one who stands in their way as an enemy, even if he happen to be a friend ; for they even mismanage their own i ests. in the eager rivalry of the moment.

XLII. “ Bearing these favours in mind—let every young man here be told of them by one who is older—do you consider it your duty to requite us with the like. And do not think that this course is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that another course is advantageous if you come to war. For advantage is most likely to result when one

75

THUCYDIDES

/ € / / e¢ \ erdyiota dpaptdvn pddiota emetat, Kal TO / lal 4 e lal ce lal uédAov TOD ToAépov @ PoBodvTes Upads Kepxv- patio. Kedevouow abixelv ev abavel Err KeiTaty Kab > ” 5] Gé > a \ 4 a nO ovK akiov érapOévtas avt@ pavepav exlpav non \ > / \ / / kal ov pédXovcav pos Kopuvdious KTHnocac0at, n / X ris 58 brapyovons mpotepov 61a Meyapéas vTro- vrias cabpov vdereivy wadrov (7 yap TeNeuvTaLa ydpis Katpov éxouca, Kiv éXdoowy 7, dwvaTat a 4 lal J / lal petCov eyKAnua AUcaL), Nd OTL VaVTLKOU Eup- / / U / > / . paxlay peyarny b:8dacr, TovT@ eperAnerVau TO a ¢ / yap pr adixetv TOvS opolous ExUpwTépa SvVams 7) ra cal / \ / T® adtixa dhavep® éraplévtas bia Kivdvvwv TO Tréov EXEL. a / lol XLII. “‘“Hpets 8& tepuettmxortes ois év TH \ Aaxedaiuove avtol mpoeiropuev, Tovs odetépous KB / > f / fa) ’ e lal Evppadyous avtoy twa Kodalev, viv Tap vmov X > ip > nn / \ \ ipl e , TO avTo akiodpev KopifecOar, Kal pn TH NMETEPA / 3 7 lal ec / € r Fr wido apernGevtas TH vpeTEepa Nas Brawat. / lal lal zo 8é loov avtaTobote, yvovTes TOUTOV éKeElvoOY e 6 elvau Tov Kaipov, év @ 6 Te VToupyav pidos pa- \ / ALoTa Kal 6 avTiaTas exXOpos. Kal Kepxupatous / / 4 / / ¢ rn ye tovode pate Evppayous déxecVe Big rjuov unre auvvete avtois adixodow. Kal Tade Tol- rn / \ obvTes TA TpoornKovTa Te Spdcete Kal TA apiota a na 9 Bovrevoeabe vpiv avtois. XLIV. Toratta 5€ xal of KopivOsou eitzov. , al \ > / ’ / / A@nvaior S€ akovoavtTes apPpoTepwv, yevomevns

76

BOOK I. xu. 2-xtiv. 1

errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong- doing, is still uncertain; and it is not worth while for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course to remove something of the suspicion which has heretofore existed on account of the Megarians!; for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be carried away by present appearances and seek an advantage by incurring dangers.

XLIII. “ But we, since events have brought us under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now claim from you in return the same treatment—that you who were then_aided by our vote should not in-

__ jure us by yours. ‘Pay back like with like, determining that this is thé supreme moment when assistance is the truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility. We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting your own best interests.” eS

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4.

77

bo

THUCYDIDES

\ 8 > Xx / a \ / > ? kal Sis éxxAXnolas, TH ev TpoTepa ovyY Hocov

r /, ’ / \ / b] »* ~ tav Kopiw0iwv amedéEavto tovs Noyous, ev b€ TH

/ voTepata petéyvwmoav Kepxupators Evxpuaxiav pev 7 un tonoacbat wate TOUS avTous €xPpous Kal

f / ’ » > \ / > / dhirous voutfew (Ee yap émt KopivOov éxéXevov

/ e 4 lal / ae! > an odio ot Kepxupatos: Evytrdety, €XvovT’ av avtois

e \ / / > , \ ai mpos IleXotrovyncious otrovéat), émipayiav dé > , A > / A 27 ro erroinoavtTo TH AAAnAwY BonOeiv, Edv Tis ert

> \ Kepxupav in 1 AGjvas 7) TOUS TOUT@Y EvmpaXous. edoxer yap oO ™pos IleAorovynaious TONELOS Kal as écecOat avtois, Kal THV Képeupav éBovrovro yn) mpoérbar tots Kopw@tois vavtixoy éyovoap r / ev \ tocouTov, Evyxpovew S¢€ OT: puddAlaTa avTOUS > / c/s > / Ss A / arrAnroLs, Wa aclevertépors ovow, hv Te S€n, Kopi@iors te Kat Tois adXots Tots! vauTiKoV éxoval €s TOAE“Ov KabiaoTa@vTal. apa de THs TE / lal , al

"Iranias Kai Xuxedias Kad@s epaiveTo avTois 1 vijoos év TapaTA® Keto Oat.

XLV. Toravtn pev yroun ot ‘A@nvaior TOUS Kepxupaiovs mpocedéEavto, cal tav Kopivbiwv aTeNOovT@yv ov ToAv UaoTtepov Séxa vads avTois > / / ’ / \ > nw” anéatekav BonOovs: eotpatnye 6€ avt@v Aake- in / / ec / \ , e Sapovios te 0 Kipwvos cai Acotimos 0 Xtpop-

, \ / ng / a \ Bixov cat IIpwréas o ’Emixdéous. mpoetrrov dé

cal al / \ avtois pn vavpayeiv KopivOios, yv pn emt / / Képxupav mAéwot kal péAdwowv avroPaivew 7 és

a /

TOV €xelvOV TL Ywpiwy: oUTw SE KwAVELY KATA lal lal n \ 7 Sivapuv. tTpoettov d€ TavTa TOU pH AvELY Evexa

\ s Tas oTOVOdS. y 4 aaeq by Bekker. 78

BOOK I. xiv. 1-x.v. 3

session of the Ecclesia ; and although at the earlier one they were rather inclined to agree with the words of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided, not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans then asked them to join in an expedition against Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re- sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians—- but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid one another in case anyone should attack Corcyra or

Athens or the allies of either..For they believed that.,_-,

in any eventsthe war with the Peloponnesians would / have to be faced{ and they did not wish to give up

Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, ~~

but hoped to wear them out upon one another as much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as well as other naval powers} might be found weaker in case they had to go to war with them. Besides, the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily.?

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their -aid,soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten _ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some ‘place belonging to the Corcyraeans; but in that case they were to thwart them if possible. The object of these orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii, 2. 2 of. ch. xxxvi. 2,

79

THUCYDIDES

\ fal an XLVI Ai péev 8) vies adixvodvta és TH Képxupav. oi 8& Kopiv@tot, érretdn avtots mape- oKevacto, érAeov él THY Képxupay vavat TevTN- J > Kovta kal éxatov. joav be "Hrelwv pev déxa, / , Meyapéwv 5é SHdexa cai Aeveadioy déxa, ’Apu- a BY > mpaxiotav dé€ émta Kal elkogt Kal “Avaxtoplov pia, avtav é KopiwOiev évevnxovta: otpatnyot / / Sé tovTwV hoav pev Kal KaTa TOES ExdoTOD, — € KopwOiwy S¢ Bevoxreidyns 0 Evdudéous réurtos a \ avtos. é7evd1 5é mpocéuerEav TH Kata Képxupay / \ / id , nreip@ amo Aevxddos mréovtes, oppilovTat és Xecpéprov ths Oecompawridos vis. éarte dé App, nr al \ Kal mods UTép avToD KeiTar amo OadXacons ev th Eraratide ths Oca pwridos Edvpy. €&inar de ’ Ce tee , , . ; \ Trap avtnv Axepovoia ripyn és Oaraccav: dia S¢ ths Oecrpwridos “Axépwv Totapos péwv b] t I] > £ > ’ n \ \ > _4 ésBadrer és auTnv, ap ov Kal THY eTTMVUMLAY cr / \ ec yer, per S€ cal Ovapis rotapes opifov thy 7 Wcorpawrida xal Keotpivny, av évtos 7 axpa / fol avéyer TO Xeupépiov. ot pev ov KopivOrot tis lal c Hareipov évtav0a oppuitovtat te Kal otpatomredov €TOLNCAVTO. aA v XLVII. Of 8 Kepxupatos @s na8ovto avtous TpocmdéovTas, TANpwaavTEes O€KA KAL EKATOV rn > * 4 \ > , \ eons vais, av Apye Mixradys cai Aloiutdns kat Evpv- Batos, éotpatoTedevoavTo ev puad TOV VHTwY at o > a Kadovvtat SUBora, kal ai Attixai déxa Taphoav. éxl 88 7H Aevxipyy abtois TO axpwtnpio o Telos / € al iv cal ZaxvvOiov yidvot oditar BeSonOnxores. » \ \ a , ’ nw >, / \ Aoav b€ Kal Tois KopwOiows év TH nTEelpw TOAXOL rn / Ul e \ / tav BapBapwv tapaBeBonOnxotes: of yap TavTy nr , / lal rep@tat aiel Tote pidou avTOIs Elo, 80

BOOK I. xtvi. 1-xtvu. 3

XLVI. These ships arrived at Corcyra, and the Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, sailed against Corcyra with one hundred and fifty ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve

to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, sememteen!.....

to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety to the Corinthians. themselves. The several cities had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of Euthycles and four others commanded the Corin- thians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It isa harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. There is also the river Thyamis, which separates Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast anchor and made a camp.

XLVII. The Corcyraeans, when they became aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being alsopresent. Their land-forces were at the promon- tory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcy- raeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many barbarians who had assembled on the mainland ad- jacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that region have always been friendly to them.

81

THUCYDIDES

XLVIII. ’Eevd1) 6€ mapecxevacto tots Kopw- 4 an a , Giows, NaBovTes TPL@Y HuEPp@V CLTia aVvyyoVTO 2 ws éml vavpaxyla ao Tov. Xetpeplov vuKTos, Kal lal \ Qn dua Em TA€ovTES KaABopHat Tas TOV KepKupatov 4 , a / 3 vais meTewWpous TE Kal eTTL ohas TAEOVGAS. WS \ al b] / > yA > % 5€ xateldov aAXANAOUS, aVTLTApETaoCOVTO, ETL \ \ \ , , ents \ pev TO SeEvov Képas Kepxupaiwy at “Attixal r \ \ v > \ ’ lal / / / ves, TO O€ AXAO AUTOL ETELYOY TPLa TEXAN TOLN- al lal * » Lal Lal CAVTES TOV VEO, @Y ApPYE TPLOVY OTPATHYOV \ A Exdaotov els. ovTw sev Kepxupatoe étaéavto. \ \ \ / e 4 KopwOiors dé TO ev SeEvov xépas at Meyapices yes elyov Kal. al "Apmpaxiwtioes, Kata Sé TO v / , pécov of adXAoL Evppmaxyor ws ExacToL, EevMVYUpOY x Pr / a / lal a dé Képas avtol ot Koptv@.or tals apiota TaY vewv / \ \ > / \ \ \ mreoveats Kata Tovs A@nvaiovs Kat To dekov al / s » tav Kepxupawy etyov. 3 — / lal XLIX. Euppeiéavtes 6é, éredn Ta onpueta e / ” bd / \ \ e / EXATEPOLS PCN, EvavLAaYouV, TONAOUS LEV OTALTAS , \ lal ExovTes aupoTEepor ETL TOV KATATTPWLUTwY, TOA- ‘ lol al ovs 6€ TofoTas TE Kal UKOVTLOTAaS, TO Taral@ , > , ” , 2 2 Tpom@ ameporepoy éTL TapEecKevaapEvoL, Hy TE c a \ / > e 4 1) VavLAYLa KAPTEPa, TH meV TEXVN OVY oOpLolws, / x \ / \ 2 > \ 3 Tweloua\la dé TO TA€Ov TpoaddgeEpis ovaa. érrEeLd7) yap mpoaBaXotev addXnXoLS, OV padiws aTredvoVTO © a ‘ \ r an rn UmTo0 Te TOU TAIOOUS Kal OXAOU THY Ve@V Kal Lar- ov TL TLaTEVOVTES ToOls ETL TOU KaTATTPwLATOS € / e omTAlTals €s THY ViKHY, ol KaTaTTaVTES éuayoTO novyalovea@y tav vewv: SiéxtAoL O€ OK Hoar, > \ A << \ , > , a G\rXa Oup@e Kal pwn TO TWAEOV Evavayouy 7H 82

BOOK I. xiviu, 1-xLix. 3

XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, who themselves held the rest of the line forming three divisions, each under the command of one of the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed them- selves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, in the centre were the other allies with their several contingents, while the left was held by the Corinth- ians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcy- raeans.

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either side they joined battle and fought, both having many hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless ; and there was no cutting of the line,! but they fought with fury and brute strength rather than

1 SiéxmAovs was a breaking of the line so as to ram the enemy’s ship in the flank or astern.

83

THUCYDIDES

emer My TAVvTany pevy ovv Tous GopuBos Kal rapaxoons ay ” vaupaxia év 7 ab “Arrixal VES TaparyyVomeval Tots Kepxupaioss, el 17 meCowvTo, poBov jev Tapetxov Tots evavTiows, payns 6€ ovK Hpxov OEOLoTES Ob oTparnyot TH Tpoppnaw TOV “AOnvaiov. padaora dé To deEvov KEepas TOV Kopw Gian € eTrovel. ol yap Kepxupaios elKogl vaval auTous TpeWapevor Kal KaTaoL- Eavtes omopadas €s Ti ym evpov Kal béype Tov oT patoméedou TAEvoayTeEs aut av Kal emrex BavTes évéTTpnaav TE TAS oKNVaS epmjwous Kal Ta Xprpara éiunptTacayp. TAUTD ev ovy ol Kopiv@tot Kai ot Evppaxor HoT@vTO Te Kab ot Kepxupaios €7T€- KpaTouv: m 6€ avtol HoaVv ob Kopiv@.00, éTl TO EVOVULO, TORU evik@Vv, Tots Kepxupaious TOV elKOoL vEe@Y ato Xda ovos mnGous € €k THS 610 - Eews ov TApouT@v. of dé "AOnvaior o op@vres TOUS Kepxupatous TLeComevous padhov 760 aT popa- clots errexoupour, TO pev T™ P@TOV amex ouevor @oTe pn euBarrew twit érerdn Sé 4 TpoTn evyiryveto Lap pas Kal eVEKELVTO ot Koptv@cot, Tote én Epyou TAS €LYETO 76n Kab OveKEK pLTO ovdev ETH, aXra Evverecev és TOUTO avaryKns WOTE emruxyelphoat addAnAols Tovs KopivOiovs cai ’AOn- vatous.

L. Tis 6€ tpomis yevouévns ot KoptvOro ta cxabn pev ovx elAKov avadovpevot TOV VEeaV as KATAOUGELAY, TPOS OE TOUS avO porous ETPATrOVTO povevew Ovex TAEOVTES padXov y Corypetv, TOUS Te aAvT@V pirous, ovK noOnpevot 6 OTL HooHVTO OL em T@ SeEL@ Képa, AyvoodvTes ExTEWov. TOAAMY Yap

84

BOOK I. xuix. 3-1. 2

with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pur- sued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, burned the deserted tents and plundered their property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans pre- vailed ; but on the left wing where the Corinthians themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans were being hard pressed, they began to help them more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it was conspicuously clear that they were being put to flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then at length every man put his hand to work, and fine distinctions were no longer made; matters had come to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of necessity had_to attack one another. _

-L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinth- ians did not také in tow and haul off the hulls of the ships which had been disabled, but turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being aware that their right wing had been worsted. For

85

THUCYDIDES

ve@v ovcaVv apudotépwy Kali emt modv THs Oa- Adoons éTexXovear, erred) EvvéwervEav GAANXOLS, ov padiws Thy Sidyvwow é€rrotovvTO OTrotoL expd- Tovy 7) ExpaTouvTo’ vavpayia yap avtn “EdXnot mpos “EXAnvas ve@v TAINO peyiotn 51) TOV TPO 3 avTns yeyévntar. éredyn b€ KatediwEav Tovs Kepxupaious ot KopivOsor és thy yhv, mpos Ta vavayla Kal TOUS vexpovs TOUS aeTépous EeTpa- TovTo, Kal TOV TWrEeloTwWY EexpaTnoaY WaTE Tpockopicat Tpos Ta LVBota, ov avtois o KaTa yiv otpatos tav BapBdpwv mpoceBeBonO Ker: éote 5€ Ta LvBota THs Oeowpwridos Asn éphymos. Tovto O€ Toincavtes avOis aOporcBévtes 4 érémAeov Tots Kepxupaios. ot d€ tais mAWLpOLS Kal doar Hoav otTal peta TOV “ATTLK@Y vedv Kal aUTOL avTeTémAcor, SeicavTes mn es THY YH 5 cdav Teipwow atoBaivev. dn O€ Hv oe Kal €TETALAVLOTO aUTols ws €$ éTrimAOUY, Kal ol Kopiv@ror €Eatrivns tpvpvav éxpovovto, KaTLOOVTES elxoot vats ‘AOnvaiwy tpocrXeovaas, as tatepov tav d€xa BonJovs é€émreuWav of "AOnvaion, det- TAVTES, OTTEP eryevETO, UH ViKYO@ TW of Kepxupaior Kal at opétepar O€xa ves OrALyYaL apuvELY WoL, LI. tavtas otv mpoidovtes of KopivOior Kat urotomnaavtes am “AOnvav eivar, ovy boas 2 éEwpwv adda TELOUS, UTaVveYwpouV. Tois dé Kep- Kupato.s (€rémeov yap wadrov éx Tov adbavods)

1 Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, where Greeks had fought against Persians,

86

BOOK I. L. 2-11. 2

since the ships or the two fleets were many and covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to determine just who were conquering and who were being conquered ; for this sea-fight was in number of ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had ever before fought against Hellenes.! But as soon as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,? and they were able to recover most of them and to fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes- protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had come to their aid. When they had accomplished this, they got their forces together and sailed once more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that they would attempt to disembark on their territory. It was now late and the paean had been sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be de- feated and their own ten ships would be too few to help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that they were from Athens and that there were more of them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing up more out of view and could not be seen by them,

2 The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled ships.

87

THUCYDIDES

b e a“ \ b] 4 \ , ovy éwpavto, kat eBavpafov tots Kopiwiious / / cd mpuuvav Kpovopévous, mpiv tives LOovTes etmov Ste vhes éxetvar emimdéovow. Tote 61 Kal avTOL > , / x A A e / aveywpouv (Evverxotale yap 76), kat ot KopivOcoe 3 atotpaTomevot THY biddvoW ETTOLNTAVTO. OVTM \ c > b, tee. / > / Vict / pev 1) ATTAANAaYN EYEVETO AAANAD, Kal 1 VaVPLAXLA / a \ / 4 éTedevTa és vUKTAa. Tots de Kepxupatots oTpato- rf / % rn medevomevors emt TH AevKipyn at eixoot vies at > a cy a z 2 = / © éx tav A@nvav atta, wv npxe lAavewy Te o , RPS / ¢ / \ r Aedypov cai “Avdoxidns 0 Aewyopov, dia Taev nr / a“ vexp@v Kal vavaylwv TpocKoma0elioar KaTETEOV és TO oTpaToTedov ov TOAA® baTepov 7) wPOnaar. rn \ / / 5 of 6& Kepxupaio (Hv yap vv&) épo8nOncav pn TONeULAL MOLD, ETTELTA OE EyVWOAY KA WpuloarTo. a / / LIL. TH 6é torepaia avayayouevar at te’ Arti- , a \ a kal tpidxovta vies kal tov Kepxupaiwy doar TrMLLOL Hoav eTéTAEVGAY ETL TOV ev TOIs LuBo- / b] e e / vw u tows Atméva, ev & ot KopivOtor wpuovy, Bovdo- >? 2 evor eldevar eb vavpaynoovow. ot dé Tas pev S \ ral A \ yavs dpavtes amo THS ys Kal wapatakapevor , / / petewpous navyafov, vavpaxias ov dravoovpevor dpyew EXOVTES, OPAVTES TpoTyeyernuevas TE VAUS , r > nr ’ lal \ / x \ éx Tov AOnvav axpaipvets Kat opiot Toda TA v / 3 , \ aropa Evx~BeS8nkota, aiywadwrtov Te Tepl puda- Ks, ods év Tals vavaoly elxyov, Kal émiaKevnY OvK a lal / lal 3 ovcay TaV veav ev ywpio épyjuw: Tod b€ olkade ToD parrov SecKoTrovy 67n Ko“icOnoovTat, de- / a / Sudtes un) of “AOnvaior vouioavtes AedXVaBaL Tas / lal = loa ~ otrovéas, SuoTt és yetpas HdOov, ovK eWar ohas arom Nelv. lal ¥ LIII. "Eéofev ody adtois avdpas és KeXnTLOV

88

BOOK I. ut. 2-Lul. 1

and so they wondered that the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them caught sight of the ships and said, ‘‘ Yonder are ships sailing up.” Then they too retreated—for it was already getting dark ; whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and broke offthe action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed down to the camp not long after they were sighted. And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized them and the ships came to anchor.

LII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, although they put out from shore and drew up in line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves were involved in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the captives whom they had in their ships and the im- possibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were more concerned about was the voyage home, how they should get back, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider that the treaty had been broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some

89

THUCYDIDES

éuSiBaoavtas avev KnpuKeiov Tpoo me ura Tols

2 “A@nvaios Kal Teipav mouncac Gar. TEMA AVTES Te éheyou * Totabe* “ ‘Adixcite, @ o avd pes ‘AOnvaior, TONE LOU apxovres Kal omoveas AvovTeEs” nly yap TONEULOUS TOUS MLETEPOUS TL pOUMEVOLS éuTrodwy istacGe oTXa VT ALpopevot. et O° viv youn €oTl KwAVELY TE Nas emt Képxupav 7 adXoceE et an Bovropeba TrELY Kal Tas oToVdas RUETE, nas Tovcde mpwrovs AaPovtes yYpHncadbe as

3 modemios.” of pev 67 ToLlavdTa eEitrov' TaV Se Kepxvpaiwy To wey otpatotredov bcov émnKkouvaev aveBoncev evOvs XaBety Te avTOVS Kal aTroKTEtvat,

4 of 6€ “A@nvaios To.doe atrexpivavto: “ Ourte ap- Xopev TONE LOD, @ avopes Tedorovyncror, ouTeE Tas omoveas Avouer, Kepxupators bé Tota be Evp- payxos ovat Bono iAGouev. et pev odY AdroGE mot BovrecGe rely, ov K@hvopev" et Oe ent Képxupay Trevaeiabe 7; i) és TOV EXELYWY TL YWpLOD, ov mepiowopeOa Kata TO duvaTov.”

LIV. Toratdta tav ‘AOnvaiwy atroxpivapévov of pev KopivOtor Tov Te TAOUY TOV ew oiKoU TapeE- axevalovto Kal TpoTatov Eotnaay év Tois ev TH HT E(p@ LuBoros: ol O€ Kepxupaior Td Te vavayla Kal VEKPOUS avethovTo 7a KaTa opas, efevex Oev- TOV vmo Te TOU pov Kal avémou, ds YEVOMEVOS TIS VUKTOS dueaxébacev auTa TAVTAXh, Kal TpoTtaiov avtéstncay €v Tois ev TH VD 2uBorous @sS

2 vevixnxotes. yvopun 6€ Tordde Exatepos THY VviKnV mpocerotnaavto’ KopivOsor pev KpaTicavtes TH

1 To bear a herald’s wand would have been a recognition of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians,

go

BOOK I, tui. 1-tiv. 2

men, without a herald’s wand,! into a boat and send them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. And these men bore the following message: “ You do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a treaty ; for by taking up arms against us you inter- fere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here and treat us as enemies.”” Thus they spoke; and all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within hearing shouted : “ Take them and kill them!” But the Athenians made answer as follows: “ We are not beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you ; but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to prevent it.”

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland ; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies? that had been carried in their direction by the current and by the wind, which had arisen in the night and scattered them in en! es and set up, as being, the victors, a rival _ troph n the island. \ Each side claimed )

| the —_ on the following grounds: The Corinth- / ~ Jans™set up a trophy because they had prevailed in

2 Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was therefore a claim of victory.

gI

THUCYDIDES

vaupaxia HEXpL VUKTOS, OOTE KAL vavdya TreloTa Kai vexpous TporKkouicad Gat, Kal avopas ¢ EXOVTES aly LaXwTous ovK éXaoooUS Xo vaus Te KaTa- dvcavtes Trepl éBoounkovta éoTnoav Tpotatov: } Kepxupaior é€ TplaxovTa vavs pardtoTa ova Oet- partes, Kal emeon "AOnvaior 7Oov; aVENO EVOL Ta KaTa opas auToUS vavayla Kal vexpous, Kal OTL avtois TH Te 7 potepata Tpvpvav KpOvOopLevot UTeXwpnaav OL Kopiv@voe “iSévtes Tas ‘Artikas vaus, Kat eed) HAGov ot "AOnvaiot, ovK avTereé- TEov €x TOV LUBdTwr, dia TadTa TpoTaiov éoTN- cav. oUTw mer ExaTEpor ViKav HELovYS

LV. Oc 6€ KopivO:oc aroméovtes é’ oixou "Avaxtopiov, 6 éotw éri TO oTopate ToD “Ap- TpaKlKOU KONTOV, elAOv amatn (AY Oe KoLVOY Kepxupaiwr Kal exeivav), Kal KaTaoTicavres év avT@ KopwOtous oLKnTropas avex@pno ay em olxou" Kat Tov Kepxupaiwy OKTAKOTLOUS bev ov oa dovA0L arédovTo, TEVTHKOVTA b€ Kai dLa- _Koclous Ojoavres epvhaccoy Kal év Jepareta elov TONAH, OTWS avTots THY Képxupav ava- Xopnravres Tpoomonceray” eT UY Xavov o€ (Kal Ouvapet avTay ot Welous Tparor ovTes Ths TONEWS. 7) ev ovv Képxupa ovtT# Tepuyiyverat TO TONE MD TOV KopwOwr, Kal a pijes TOV "AOnvaiay a avexopnoay é€ aur is. aitia &é abrn Tporn éryéveTo Tou TONELOU Tobs Kopivdtous és TOUS ’A@nvaious, 6Tt odiow év orovdais peta Kepxvupatwv evaAU LAX OUY.

LVI. Mera tatta & etOis cali rade EvvéBn

1 Zarnoav tooraiov bracketed by Hude, following Kriiger.

92

BOOK I. tiv. 2-.vi. 1

the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships ; and the Corcyraeans, because they had de- stroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battle— for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side claimed the victory.

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcy- raeans and themselves in common, and establishing there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they seld eight hundred who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody and treated them with much con- sideration, their motive being that when they re- turned to Corcyra they might win it over to their side ;! and it so happened that most of these were among the most influential men of the city. In this way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war Ss with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians — ~ withdrew from it. {And this was the first ground |

‘which the Corinthians had for the war against the\ | Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcy- ~ raeans against them in time of truce. “~~LVI. Immediately after this the following events

r

1 cf. 111. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra.

93

THUCYDIDES

ryeréa Oat TOIS: "AOnvaiows Kat TleXorovvncios dtapopa es 70 TONEMELY. TOV yap Kopibiwr pac covT@v Tas TLLOpnTovTaL avuTous, UroTo- mnoavtes THY ExOpav avTav ot “A@nvaios Tlorter- deatas, of oikovoty emt T® toOue@ tHS ladrAnvns, KopivOiwv atroixous, eauTav 6€ Evppaxous opou UTroTenets, exe NEVOV To €s Iladdnvnv tetyos Kabe- Aely Kal OmmpOUs dovvat, Tous TE emvdnpoupryous extreme Kal TO NoLTTOY wn SéxecOaL ods KATA étos éxactov Kopiv@tor. émeurrov, deicavtes pn aTooT@aL vTrd TE Tepdixxou TrevBopevor Kal Kopw0iwv, Tous Te GAXdous Tovs é7l Opaxns EvvaTootTnowat Evppaxous.

LVII. Tadta 6€ epi rods Tlotevdedtas of "A@nvaior TpoT aper KevalovTo evdus peta TV év Kepxvpa vavpaxiay’ ol TE yap Kopiv@tor pavepas dn Sidhopor Haar, Tlepdixcas te 0 AneEavépou, Maxedovev Bacrrevs, _EMET ONE MOTO Evupaxos TpoTepov Kat piros OV. erro ew dé, OTL Dirinre TO éavTob AOENG@ kat Aépda xow7 T pos | avTov evavTLOULEVOLS ot "A@nvator Evupayiav €moincavTo. Sediws Te ETpaccey és Te THV Aake- Saipwova TéuTOV OT WS TONE LOS yévntar avtois ™ pos Tledorovyya ious, Kal TOUS Kop ious T poa- ETOLELTO TIS [orevdatas évexa aTOcTagEws* TpoaEepepe dé Aovyous Kal Tots el Opakns Nah«e- dedot nat Bor TLatoLs Evvaroarivat, voter, et Evppaya tavta €éyxot, duopa ovTa, Ta yopla,

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally ee only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of

94

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BOOK I. tvi. 1-tvn. 5

also occurred, which caused differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the war. While the Corinthians were devising how they should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans (who. dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are

‘colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the”

Athenians), to pull down their wall on the»side of Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send away and not receive in the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send every year. For they were afraid that the Poti- daeans, persuaded by Perdiccas! and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea- fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he had become hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself. Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace- daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over. er Sir with a view to the revolt of

Potidaea;)and, furthermore, he mad@“overtures to”

the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia. See, further, 11. xcix. ff.

95

—- :

THUCYDIDES

fa A \ f ? » aes a 2 6 pdov av Tov TOAEMOoV peET a” TaV TroLetcBaL, wY €9 A > , 1 € , ot A@nvator aicPouevoe Kat BovNopevot TpoKaTa- a \ AapBavery TOV TOAEWY TAS aTroTTAacELs (ETUYOV la / / yap TplaKovTa vavs aTroaTédXoOVTES KAL YLALOUS e , RES, \ a ? nm ? / fal omiTas eml Thy iv avTov Apxeotpatov TOU AvKopnoous peT AXNWY Teccdpwy oTpaTHYyOUN- val Yi lal lal TOS), émlaTéAXOVGL TOs apxYovat TOV vewv IloTeL- 5 e a \ ° cal SeaT@v TE opnpous AaBEiv Kal TO TeLyos Kabenety, la / \ ty TOV TE TANGLOV TOAEWY hUAAaAKIY EXELY OTTWS [M1 aTOCTHOOVTAL. lal \ LVIII. Tlotededtar 5€ méuravtes pev xal , / map ’A@nvaiovs mpécBes, ei Twas TELcELaY pH n / / / / \ \ odhav mépt vewtepifew pndév, éeXovtes dé Kal ; on Neate SoM wii Oi tiks és tHv Aaxedaipova peta Kopiv6iov,! ores / A éToluaocawto Tiuwpiav, nv én, émerdn Ex TE "AOnvav €k ToAXOD TpacaovTes ovdEY NUpoOVTO ’ , 2 D) e a Cs RN , \ €mitndeov, GAN ai ves ai emt Maxedoviay Kal > \ a e / ” \ \ / lal él odas omoiws émEov Kat Ta TEAN TOV Aake- / a Saimoviwv. UTécxeTo avTots, Hv emi Lloreidarav ral > \ a iwow "AOnvaio, és thy Attixny écBarelv, Tote 57 KaTa TOY Kalpoyvy ToUTOY adiotayTaL peta r \ , A Xar«idéwv cai Bottiatwv xown Evvopocartes. t y / \ 2 «al Ilepdixcas 7reiGer Nadkidéas Tas evi Oadacon / , , TOAELS E€XALTTOVTAS Kal KaTtaBarXovTas avotKi- > v , , , 5) \ cacbat és “OdvvOov piav Te Tod TaVTHY LoxUpaY a ’ fal / a fal moincac@ar Tols T ExALTTOVGL TOUTOLS THS EaUTOU al a / \ yns THs Murydovias mepi tiv BorBnv Xipuvny ” / ¢ bal e \ ’ / / édwKe véwerOat, Ews av 0 Tpos ‘A@nvatous TroXe-

1 %xpaccov, before drws in all MSS., deleted by Poppo. 96

BOOK I. tvi. 5-Lvi. 2

easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the war. But the Athenians became aware of these designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them from revolting.

LVIII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade them not to take any harsh measures with reference to themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lace- daemon in the company of the Corinthians, with the object of having assistance ready to hand in case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail against themselves as well, whereas the magis- trates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to invade Attica if the Athenians went against Poti- daea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians’ and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time per suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull dowr their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war

s.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace,

9?

THUCYDIDES

5 a eece \ : , , a pos . Kal of pev av@xifovto te KaParpodytes Tas odes Kal és ToAE“ov TaperKevafovTo: LIX. ai S€ tpraxovta vies TOV “AOnvaiwy adgi- Kvoovtas és Ta et Opaxns Kai katadapBavovor tiv Te Ilotetdacav Kal TAXA adeotynKOTa. vopt- cavtes 5& of ctpatnyot abvvata eivat pos TE Tlepdixxav Todeuety TH Tapovon Suvdper Kai Ta Evvadeot@ta ywpla, Tpérovtar emt THY Maxe- Soviav, édb’ Owep Kal TO mpa@Ttov é£eTéwTrovTo, Kal KaTacTavtes €mroNguouv peta DiritT0v Kal TOV AépSou aderpav avabev otpatid ésBeBXnKOTMV.

LX. Kai &v tovt@ ot Kopiv@to1, ths Motedatas adectnkvias Kai Tov “Attixov vedv tept Make- Soviav ovadr, Sed.oTes TEpl TO Kwpio Kal oiKetov Tov Kivduvoyv Hyovpmevoe TéuTOVoW éavT@Y TE eOeXovTas Kal TOV a\Xov IleXoTOVYnGiwy p1cO@ metcavtes 飀axocious Kal ytdXiovs TOUS TavTas OmAitas Kal wWidovs TeTpaKkoclous. éaTpaTHyeL Sé aitav ’Apiotets 0 'Adetpavtou, kata pidiav TE QUTOD OvY HKLoTa of Teiatoe €x KopivOou otpati@tat eGerovtal Evvéctrovto: Av yap Tots Ilorevdedtais alei Tote émitndelos. Kai adixvovr- Tal TeccapakooTH nuepa vaotepov ert Opaxns 7 Iloreiéara atréaTn.

LXI. "HA@e 8€ Kal trois ’"AOnvatois evOvs 7 ayyedia TaV Tokewy OTL apectact, KaL Tépu- qmovow, ws noGovTo Kat Tovs peta ‘AptoTtéws érimapiovtas, Suaxidiovs éauT@v omAiTas Kal TEegaapaKoVTa vads Tpos Ta adeoTata, Kai Kad- Aiav tov Kaddiabdov réurtov avtov atpatnyov of adixopevor és Maxedoviay rp@tov KatadapBa-

98

BOOK I. tvur. 2-Lx1. 2

with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas and the places which had revolted, turned their attention to Macedonia, which was their destination at the start, and when they had got a foothold carried on war in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Mace- donia from the interior with an army.

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed about the place and thinking that the danger came home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own and such other Peloponnesians as they induced by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops. The general in com- mand was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for he had always been on friendly terms with the Poti- daeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea.

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly reached the Athenians also; and when they learned that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to support the rebels, they sent against the places in revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other generals. ‘These first came to Macedonia and found

99

THUCYDIDES

yougt TOUS TpoTépous xirtous B€punv apte 7Hp1- KOTAS KQL Ivdvay ToNopKobVTas, mpockabe- Copevor 6€ Kal avtol THY IIlvdvav emoMopenaav pév, erecta b€ EvpBaow TOLNTALEVOL al Eup- paxiav avaryKatay T pos TOV Lepéixcar, & @S aUTOUS KaTHTELYEV a Ilote(éata Kai o Aptotevs mapehn- AvG@s, atTavictavtat €K THS Maxedovias, Kal apicopevor és Bépovay KaKelOev ert =rpéyar! Kal TEelpacayTes Tp@TOv 7 TOU X.@ptov cal ouyx édovTes eT OpevovTO KaTa yiv Tpos Ty Tlote‘éavav TpLaYXLALOLS bev omAiTaus EAUTOV, Xepls d€ TOV Evppaxov Todos, iTTEVTL be é€axooious Make- Sovev Tots pera Dirimrov Kai Haveaviou: apa dé vies TapémAcov EBSdSourKovta. Kat’ odtyov 6é mpoiovtes tpttaio. adixovto és Tiywvov «al éoTpatoTredevaavTo.

LXII. Iotededtar 6€ nat ot pera *"Apiotéws TleXorrovynciot mpocdeyopuevotr tovs “A@nvaious éotpatotedevovto mpos ‘OduvvGov ev TO tcOu@ Kal ayopav é&w THs TONEwS ETTETTOiNVTO. aTpa- THOU bev ovv TOU melod TAVTOS Ob Evupaxor 7pNVvTo "Apiotéa, TAS 66 trmou Tlepdixxay: aTtéaTn yap evOUs Tad Tov ‘AOnvaiwv Kat Evvewayet Tols Tlorededrais ‘lohaov av? avtov KaTacTHoas apxovTa. av d€ 7 yvoun Tov "Apia téws, TO ev pe” EaUTOU OT pPATOTrEOY ExOvTL® év TO icOuod emeTnpely tovs A@nvaious, hv ériwat, Xan«udéas dé kal Tos &€w icO pov Evppaxous Kal THY Tapa Ilepdicxov Staxociav immov év ’OdivO@ péver,

1 él Srpévav, Pluygers’ certain emendation for émorpé- Wavtes of the MSS. 2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude.

1090

BOOK I. ix. 2-Lxu. 3

that the former thousand had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they con- cluded an agreement and an alliance with Per- diccas, being forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled them to. hasten, and then they withdrew from Mace- donia. On their way they came to Beroea and thence to Strepsa,! and after an unsuccessful at- tempt upon this place proceeded overland to Poti- daea with three thousand hoplites of their own and with many of their allies besides, and with six hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, en- camped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and they had established a market outside of the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry ; for Perdiccas had immediately deserted the Athenians again? and was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed lolaus as his administrator at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the other allies from outside of the isthmus® and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to

1 In Mygdonia, north of Therme.

2 For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii.

3 i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived out- side the isthmus.

Iol

THUCYDIDES

> ’ a ae A A A , kal 6tav A@nvaior eri spas YwpOot, KaTA vwTOU Lal lal Cal \ BonOodvtas év péow Trorety AVTA@V TOUS TrONEMLOUS. € cal > / Z KadXias 8 at 6 tTav ‘APnvaiwy otpatnyds Kal oi \ y , € ~ Evvapyovtes tovs wev Maxedovas imméas Kal Tav , >] / > Ni , > / Evppayewv ortyous éri ‘OdvvOou aroréutrovaw, ev yv \ > tal > ral > \ ‘ OTWS Elpywat Tovs EexetOev EmiBonOety, adTo dé / , avacTnaavTes TO oTpaTOTrEdoy Eywpouy él THI ’ \ \ lal lal Ilotetdarav. Kal émecdn pos TO icOue éyévovTo / Kai eldov Tovs évayTiovs TapacKxevalomévous ws , \ , és wayny, avtixabiatavto Kal avToi, Kal ov TOAD ¢i \ \ \ a tatepov Evvéutoyov. Kal avTo pev TO TOD “Apt- \ Lal aTéws KEpaS Kal Ooo. Tepl Exetvov Haav KopivOiwy Te kal TOV addwy RAoydbes ETpeWav TO Kal € \ \ > a“ , > \ , \ €autTous Kal éreEnNOov Stm@Kovtes ert TorU: TO 5€ adddXo otpatoredov Lotedeatav xai IleXo- a \ lal > / \ movvnciwv nocato uTO TaV A@nvaiwy Kal és TO a , TELyos KaTEpuyeV. a = a fol LXIII. ‘Ezavaywpav $€ 0 “Apioteds aro ths , e an \ ww / duwEews, @S Opa TO AAO GTPaTEVLA oOoHMEVO?, € / / nmopnoe pev oTroTépwae Siaxivduvevon Ywpyaas, h emt tis ‘OdvvOou 4 és thy Ilotetdarav: éoke , \ n 8 otv Euvayayovtt tovs pel’ éavtovd ws és > , , , , > \ é\ayistov ywplov dpoum BracacBar és tip \ a \ \ Iloteiéarav, kai waphdOe Ttrapa thy ynrnv ba a / , \ 7 THs Oardoons Bardopevos TE Kal yYaXeTas, OXI- , \ , , yous wév Tivas aToBadwv, Tous O€ TAELOUS Twaas. of © amo Tis (OdXvvOou trois Lotededrars BonOoi

1902

BOOK I. uxn. 3-Lxu. 2

remain at Olynthus; then when the Athenians should move against the forces of Aristeus, the others were to come up and attack them in the rear, and thus place the enemy between their two divi- sions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid from that quarter, while they themselves broke camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy pre- paring for battle, they took up their position facing them ; and soon the two sides joined battle. And the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the forces opposed to them and pressed on a long dis- tance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of Potidaea.

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He determined, however, to bring his own troops to- gether into as compact a body as possible and to force his way into Potidaea on arun. And he succeeded in getting in by way of the breakwater through the sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles ; but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater number of them. Now when the battle began and the standards had been raised,! the auxiliaries of

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through

the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could not be accomplished, they were lowered.

103

THUCYDIDES

(améyer dé eEnKovTa padre oTadtous Kal éoTe KaTapaves), WS u) payn eylyvero Kal Ta onpela 7pOn, Bpaxv pév Te _T por) Oov @S Bon? ycovtes, kat of Maxedoves imms avtitapetatavto ws KwAvaovTEs* émreldn b&€ dia Tayous H viKn TOV "A@Onvaiwy éyiyveto Kal Ta onpelta KaTeoTradOn, Tadw éravex@pour és TO Tetyos Kal of Maxedoves mapa tovs "A@nvaious: immys & ovdeTépors Trape- yévovTo. peTa O€ THY wdyNnVY TpoTatoy ~cTHnTaV of “AOnvaiot Kal Tous vexpovs voamovdous aTreé- Socav tots lotedeatais: améGavov 5é Wotedea- T@v pev Kal Tov Evupaywv orjLy@ éAdoaoOUS tpiaxootwyv, A@nvaiwy d€ avTav TevTHKOVTA Kal éxatov Kal KadXias 0 otpaTnyos.

LXIV. To 6€ é« Tob LaO ov Tetxos! evOus ol "A @nvaior arrotevxia ares ep povpour TO &° és Thy Tadrxvny areiXoTov Av ov yap ixavol évopefov elvar év TE TO LoOUO poupeiv Kal és THY Tanr- AnvHY SuaBdvres revyitew, S€OLOTES ea odiotv ot Ilotesdeatac Kal ot Evppaxor yevouevors dixa émiOwvtat. Kal TuvPavoperoe ol ev TH TOEL "A@nvator thy TladAnvnv ateiyiotov ovcav, Kpovm istepov méutovow é€axoolovs Kal xXLALous omAiTas éauT@v Kal Popptwva TOV ‘Acwmiov oTparyyov" os APLKOMEVOS és THY Tadrnvny Kal eg "Advtios opp@pevos Tpoonyaye TH Llorerdaia tov

1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude.

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry (ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3).

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians.

2 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the

104

BOOK I. vx. 2—LxIv. 3

the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea— advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Mace- donian cavalry drew up in line against them to prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon proving the victors and the standards were pulled down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action on either side.! After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians alone? about a hundred and fifty, - and also their general Callias.

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side? the Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene was not shut off. For they thought their numbers were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites under the command of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging reixos of ch. lxii. 6; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned in ch. lvi. 2 as